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In Illinois Brick v. Illinois Co., 1 the Supreme Court held that, under 
federal antitrust law, only direct purchasers have standing to sue antitrust 
violators for damages. 2 Since most products travel through one or more 
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1. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
2. Illinois Brick Co. did include narrow exceptions for cost-plus sales, for cases where the direct 
purchaser is owned or controlled by an indirect purchaser, and for cases where the direct purchaser is 
part of the violation. In practice these exceptions have not proven to be very important. See ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INDIRECT PuRCHASER LmGATION HANDBOOK 13-25 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter ABA HANDBOOK]. A related decision, Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 
(1968), held that when an antitrust violator is sued by direct purchasers, a defendant cannot successful-
ly assert as a defense that the direct purchasers passed on the overcharges to indirect purchasers. 
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intermediaries before reaching consumers,3 this decision left most true 
victims of illegal cartels and other antitrust violations without a remedy to 
compensate them. 4 Illinois Brick Co. also had the effect of undermining 
the objective of optimal deterrence of antitrust violations-because direct 
purchasers5 often have a suboptimal incentive to sue,6 the Court's decision 
often allows violators to escape paying significant damages. For this rea-
son firms are insufficiently deterred from committing future violations. 7 
Fortunately, states are able to effectively overturn this decision by 
passing legislation that gives indirect purchasers within that state the right 
to collect damages from antitrust violators. 8 Not surprisingly, many states 
enacted laws, called Illinois Brick Repealers ("mRs"), to give indirect 
purchasers the right to sue when firms violate analogous state antitrust 
laws.9 The majority of states now have some form of mR. 10 
In recent years, state mRs have become more visible and important in 
light of a number of extremely large, successful recoveries made under the 
laws of those states that have effective mRs. These have totaled billions of 
dollars, including the $335 million paid by the vitamin cartel to settle pri-
vate class actions and parens patriae cases brought by twenty-four states' 
attorneys general on behalf of indirect purchasers who were consumers in 
3. Vitamins, for example, typically pass through several intermediaries before reaching their 
ultimate users. Due to Illinois Brick Co., few vitamins consumers were able to collect damages from 
the international vitamins cartels for damages under federal law. The implications of this decision for 
the victims of the largest discovered private cartel in history were enormous because the cartels had 
raised the prices of most vitamins sold worldwide between 1990 and 1997 by an average of approx-
imately 30%. See 10hn M. Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and Dete"ence 
(Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 06-02, 2006), available at 
http://www . antitrustinstitute. orgl arch ives/files/485. pdf. 
4. Indirect purchasers successfully can sue wrongdoers for injunctive relief, but this does not 
compensate them for past overcharges. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 23-25. 
5. For convenience this Article refers to direct and indirect ·purchasers" even though sellers also 
can be victimized by antitrust violations. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal 
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (holding that sellers can maintain treble damages actions against firms 
that fixed the prices they paid for goods). 
6. While direct purchasers have the legal right to collect damages and often have the best infor-
mation about market conditions, they may lack sufficient incentives to do so. For example, their moti-
vation to sue can be low when they are able to pass on most or all of the illegal overcharges to the next 
level in the distribution chain and/or when they fear retaliation in their future business dealings with 
powerful suppliers. See discussion infra Parts LA, IILC. 
7. Id. For a discussion of optimal deterrence in this context see infra Parts LA. and note 183. 
See also Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 LoY. CONSUMER L. 
REv. 329, 331-39 (2004) [hereinafter Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels], available at 
http://papers.ssm.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1118902. 
8. State legislation was specifically permitted in California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 
(1983). 
9. See Ronald W. Davis, Indirect Purchoser Litigation: ARC America's Chickens Come Home 
To Roost On The Illinois Brick Wall, 65 ANTITRUST L.l. 375 (1997). 
10. Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and A Look Ahead, 17 LoY. CONSUMER L. 
REv. 1, 19 (2004) (stating that 30 states have an ffiR). The precise number depends upon a number of 
definitional considerations, such as whether state consumer protection statutes that can accomplish 
similar tasks are counted, and whether state statutes passed prior to Illinois Brick Co. that permit 
indirect purchaser suits are counted. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 26-28. 
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their states. ll These settlementsl2 have caused many legislators and others 
living in states without effective mRs to consider legislation that would 
enable indirect purchasers in their state also to have the right to obtain 
compensation for antitrust injuries. Moreover, many have come to believe 
that the current overall effective levels of antitrust damages are too low to 
deter most violations. 13 New and more effective mRs would be an addi-
tional way to help prevent anticompetitive behavior. For these and other 
reasons, during the next few years a number of states might want to enact 
new mR legislation or pass laws to strengthen their existing mR.14 
For a number of reasons not every state has decided, or will decide, to 
enact mR legislation. 15 Moreover, those states that have decided to enact 
some form of mR have passed a wide variety of legislation. 16 This lack of 
uniformity at the state level can be attributed to a number of causes, in-
cluding political factors, the interests of local businesses, the desire to 
avoid wasteful, costly, and lengthy duplicative litigation,17 and a state's 
11. See Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Canel Prosecutions and the Coming of International 
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.I. 711 (2001). For other recent prominent examples, see Patrick E. 
Cafferty, Indirect Purchaser Class Action Settlements (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 06-05, 
2006), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/51O.pdf, and Robert H. Lande & 
Ioshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Fony Cases, 42 U.S.F. 
L. REv. 879, 899 tbl.4 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd = 1090661. 
12. Most recoveries are by settlement, and there have been many settlements of indirect purchaser 
cases in which overcharged consumers recovered significant damages. See Cafferty, supra note 11 
(identifYing eighty-four significant successful settlements of indirect purchaser cases, but no final 
victories) . 
13. See discussion infra notes 38-39. 
14. Some existing state mRs are quite limited. State mRs can, for example, only apply to certain 
industries, only apply to governmental purchasers, or only empower the state Attorney General to file 
class actions. These are discussed infra Part I.C. 
15. Many of the reasons against enacting state mR legislation are contained in William H. Page, 
Class Interpleader: The Antitrust Modernization Commission's Recommendation to Overrule Dlinois 
Brick, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 725 (2008). Professor Page is opposed to indirect purchaser laws for two 
primary reasons: 
First, a pure direct purchaser regime would provide the most efficient means of imposing a 
deterrent penalty equal to three times the overcharge .... Second, even if compensation is 
an appropriate goal, indirect purchaser suits will not achieve it. We are all indirect purchas-
ers of goods that are more expensive because of antitrust violations; most of us have even 
received notice that we were members of putative or certified classes. But our harms are 
too diffuse, too individualized, and too small for the courts to calculate and distribute effi-
ciently. The legal system should focus its energies on imposing the appropriate deterrent 
penalty for antitrust violations at the lowest possible direct cost. 
Id. at 744. See also Cavanagh, supra note 10, at 25-27. Those who oppose state enactment of mRs 
tend to focus heavily on the possibility that "duplicative" payments made under federal and state 
antitrust laws could mean that wrongdoers might have to pay "too much" and that some classes of 
plaintiffs who were not injured very much will be overcompensated. They also tend to give inadequate 
attention to the possibility that, overall, there is suboptimal deterrence of antitrust violations and that 
their proffered system might leave many real victims uncompensated. 
16. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at app. a, 305-41 (2007). 
17. Professor Page correctly observes that, although there are many disagreements, "[a]l1 agree 
... that the multiple suits have led to wasteful duplication of litigation. " Page, supra note 15, at 728. 
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history.18 The great variety of existing state IBRs that will be discussed 
throughout this Article attests to states' needs for individually tailored so-
lutions to their indirect purchaser problems. 
Many advantages would of course arise if a national law were enacted 
to overturn Illinois Brick. 19 In many respects this would be better than the 
current system, where many states have no IBR, some have modest or 
very limited IBRs, and others have strong IBRs. A national solution would 
increase uniformity, predictability, and economy of litigation. It has been 
sought many times since the Illinois Brick decision, by a large number of 
individuals and organizations.20 However, to date every one of the numer-
ous attempts to achieve a comprehensive federal solution has failed, per-
haps because there has never been a national political consensus as to 
which provisions such a law should contain, and also because a uniform 
federal solution would require preempting existing state laws, an extreme-
ly controversial political outcome. 21 
In light of this thirty year stalemate on the federal level, this Article 
will not join the ranks of futile attempts to craft a political compromise 
that could be enacted nationally. Instead, this Article will focus on reform 
at the state level, where it is much more achievable. This Article will de-
velop and present a large number of IBR options that will address the 
spectrum of a jurisdiction's potential needs, a range of choices that could 
be considered favorably by states deciding to adopt or amend legislation in 
this area. 
This Article first will present a number of variations on the fundamen-
tal core provisions of an IBR. Next will follow a number of important 
specialized provisions a state or the federal government might decide to 
enact, including options involving a unique role for state attorneys gener-
al, direct versus indirect purchaser damages allocation provisions, damag-
es markup presumptions, and provisions concerning standing, class action 
18. [d. Professor Cavanagh also stresses the "logistical nightmare for the courts" with accompany-
ing wasteful litigation and delays that the current system can constitute. Cavanagh, supra note 10, at 
30. 
19. As Professor Page notes, see Page, supra note 15, it certainly would be desirable if compre-
hensive federal legislation could be enacted that would simplify and rationalize the existing system. 
Moreover, it is difficult to find many members of the antitrust community who think highly of the 
existing framework. See discussion infra note 25. 
20. Many attempts have been made to design and secure the passage of such legislation over the 
years, but all have failed. The most recent prominent attempt was that by the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission. For a summary of this history, see ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 5; Cavanagh, 
supra note 10, at 3 n.8, 23-25. 
21. The failure to enact federal legislation could arise from the fact that there has never been a 
national consensus as to which provisions such a law should contain, and also because a uniform 
federal solution could require preempting existing state laws, an extremely controversial outcome. See 
I. Thomas Prud'homme, Ir. & Ellen S. Cooper, One More Challenge for the AMC: Repairing The 
Legacy of lllinois Brick, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 675, 677 (2006) ("Attempts to broker a compromise 
among these competing interests have so far failed. Indeed, satisfying all parties may be impossible. ") 
(footnote omitted). 
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certification, and proof of damages issues. The Article contains a number 
of reasonable alternative ways to address these issues/2 together with 
commentary giving the major3 effects, advantages, and disadvantages of 
each. 24 
As its conclusion, the Article shows why a Type I, II, III error analy-
sis is the ideal framework to evaluate proposed legislation in this field. In 
light of this approach, the Article then proposes the model legislation the 
framework suggests is optimal. 25 While the Article makes every attempt to 
craft a compromise that successfully balances all relevant, competing con-
cerns, this Model Statute is proffered with full knowledge that it will not 
be appropriate for every state to enact. States for which the proposed 
Model Statute is not appropriate could, however, consider enacting anoth-
er of this Article's proposed alternatives.26 
I. THE CORE COMPONENTS OF AN [UINOIS BRICK REPEALER 
A. Complete Illinois Brick Repealers 
An IBR could be enacted for reasons of either compensation or deter-
rence, or for both reasons. 27 An overview of these issues' implications for 
IBRs will be discussed in tum. 
Compensation perspective:28 If only direct purchasers are permitted to 
sue for damages, then the purchasers that ultimately absorbed the over-
22. This Article will not attempt to cover every possible alternative. For simplicity, many of the 
less important or less likely to be enacted possibilities have been omitted. 
23. Many of the topics discussed infra are so important and complex they have been the subject of 
separate law review articles. Rather than evolve into a treatise, this Article will only summarize the 
main considerations involved and provide citations to the relevant literature. 
24. Most of these options were found either in a survey of existing mRs or in the academic litera-
ture. No attempt was made to analyze in detail every state remedy statute, academic proposal, or 
relevant state court decision. 
25. This Article's proposed Model Illinois Brick Repealer or one of the alternatives suggested in 
this Article could be enacted on the federal level, as a supplement to state legislation or in a manner 
that preempts state mR laws. Since this Article's proposed Model Statute was not crafted with the idea 
that it might serve as a compromise that could be enacted on the federal level, however, it is not prof-
fered for possible federal enactment. 
26. Moreover, if the national political climate for proconsumer legislation becomes especially 
favorable, one of the Article's proposed alternatives could of course be enacted at the federal level. 
27. For evidence that the antitrust laws, including their damages provisions, were enacted both for 
reasons of compensation and deterrence, see Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really 
Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1993) [hereinafter Lande, Single Damages?], available at 
hnp:llpapers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd = 1134822. 
28. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 530, 530 n.20 (1983) ("The legislative history of the section shows that Congress was primarily 
interested in creating an effective remedy for consumers who were forced to pay excessive prices by 
the giant trusts and combinations that dominated certain interstate markets. . .. The original proposal, 
which merely allowed recovery of the amount of actual enhancement in price, was successively 
amended to authorize double-darnages and then treble-darnages recoveries, in order to provide other-
wise remediless small consumers with an adequate incentive to bring suit. . . . The same purpose was 
served by the special venue provisions, the provision for the recovery of attorney's fees, and the 
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charges from a violation, who are usually indirect purchasers,29 will re-
main uncompensated. The goal of compensating the actual victims of anti-
trust violations surely is the primary reason why many desire to repeal 
Illinois Brick. 30 
Optimal Deterrence Perspective: Often optimal deterrence can be 
achieved best by direct purchaser suits, but other times, indirect purchaser 
suits can achieve it best. 31 Direct purchasers usually have "superior infor-
mation and incentives, and thus were more likely to discover and police 
antitrust violations.,,32 They usually are better positioned than indirect pur-
chasers to detect price fixing and other illegal behavior. They understand 
the market with the potential antitrust violation better because they deal 
directly with it, and so are more likely to be able to determine when, for 
example, prices rose due to cartelization instead of higher costs. Another 
factor militating for direct purchaser suits is that proof problems multiply 
when a court attempts to determine what happened to the overcharge as it 
passed through each succeeding level of the distribution chain.33 Trying to 
sort out who pays how much extra due to an antitrust violation-especially 
since price affects quantity sold-dramatically raises litigation time and 
costs, and lowers predictability. All of these factors weigh in favor of hav-
ing suits by direct purchasers. 
There are, however, situations where direct purchasers have little in-
centive to sue antitrust violators, or little desire to disrupt an existing 
supply relationship. Direct purchasers often have an ongoing relationship 
with the violators, who might be the sole suppliers of the products or ser-
vices in question, and may be reluctant to sue out of fear of retaliation. 34 
elimination of any requirement that the amount in controversy exceed the jurisdictional threshold 
applicable in other federal litigation. "). See generally Harry First, Lost in Conversation: The Com-
pensatory Function of Antitrust Law (2009) (unpublished draft). 
29. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. 
REv. 1717, 1726 (1990) ("In general, it appears that more of the monopoly overcharge is passed on 
than absorbed. "). 
30. See Areeda, infra note 112. Professor Page notes that much of the impetus behind mRs 
"rest[s] on the assertion that the policy of Illinois Brick is unfair because it gives a windfall to direct 
purchasers and denies any recovery to indirect purchasers, particularly consumers, who may have 
suffered most of the harm." Page, supra note 15, at 740. 
31. For a thoughtful discussion and survey of the empirical evidence on these issues, see Barak D. 
Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect 
Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 69, 93-97 (2007). 
32. Id. at 93-94. 
33. See infra Part III.C. This does not, of course, in any way imply that indirect purchasers never 
or only rarely can prove damages reliably. In some cases the task can be simplified, at least for ulti-
mate consumers. Often they can simply compare the price they paid with the illegal conduct against 
the price they paid without the illegal conduct. Their damages simply consist of the difference between 
the two purchases. This can be simpler than tracing the amount of the overcharge passed along at each 
link in the chain of distribution. 
34. III. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) ("We recognize that direct purchasers 
sometimes may refrain from bringing a treble-damages suit for fear of disrupting relations with their 
suppliers. "); see also Richman & Murray, supra note 31, at 94. 
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Second, at times the direct purchasers can pass most or all of the over-
charges to the next level in the distribution chain. 35 Under circumstances 
when the direct purchasers lose little or nothing, they have less incentive 
to file suit. 36 Moreover, on occasion, the direct purchasers will have an 
incentive to tacitly collude with the violators and mark up the overcharges, 
so that the "direct victims" make a profit from the violation!37 As a result, 
sometimes indirect purchasers will be in a better position to become "pri-
vate attorneys general. " 
The fact that the optimal private enforcers sometimes are direct pur-
chasers, but other times are indirect purchasers, is one of the most vexing 
problems confronting anyone attempting to design legislation in the area. 
This is exacerbated by the problem that the attorneys involved may be risk 
averse and unlikely to file and vigorously pursue lawsuits unless they have 
a reasonably high expectation of success for their clients. If both the attor-
neys for the direct purchasers and also the attorneys for the indirect pur-
chasers fear that the entire award could go to the type of purchaser they do 
not represent, neither may file even if the underlying violation is clear. 
For these reasons any framework that only permits one category of plain-
tiff (whether direct or indirect purchaser) to collect damages is likely to 
lead to underdeterrence. By contrast, a system designed to give both direct 
and indirect purchasers a reasonable expectation of receiving at least some 
compensation would always give lawyers for the optimal category of 
plaintiff an incentive to file. 
These factors should be considered in light of the belief held by many 
that the current system of antitrust damages leads, as a practical matter, to 
damage levels that are inadequate to deter anticompetitive behavior opti-
mally. Some critics point out that even though antitrust violations are sup-
posed to result in treble damages, due to a variety of factors they probably 
only lead to single damages even in those relatively few cases that are not 
settled for lower amounts. 38 Yet, the damages caused by an antitrust viola-
35. See Robert L. Steiner, The Third Relevant Market, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 719, 745-58 (2000); 
Hovenkarnp, supra note 29, at 1726-28. 
36. Hovenkarnp, supra note 29, at 1727-28. Moreover, judges and juries may have a visceral 
resistance to awarding damages to buyers who pass along some or all of an overcharge. Even though 
the pass-on is legally irrelevant, those who do not specialize in antitrust often cannot quite accept that 
fact, and this can factor into the damages that ultimately are awarded to the relatively unharmed direct 
purchasers. 
37. Richman & Murray, supra note 31, at 94-95 ("Some scholars have further argued that the 
indirect purchaser rule not only fails to deter antitrust violations, but in fact also encourages additional 
antitrust violations. Because illegal cartels and monopolists can share rents with direct purchasers 
without explicitly including them in an illegal conspiracy (and threaten to boycott those who bring suit) 
antitrust violators can manipulate the incentives of the only parties who have standing .... [This] 
facilitate[ s] tacit cooperation between antitrust violators and direct purchasers that is virtually impossi-
ble to punish .... Anecdotal evidence further supports this theory, as direct purchasers were impor-
tant contributors to several recent high-profile illegal cartels. "). 
38. See Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels, supra note 7. For an analysis of the actual size of anti-
trust's "treble damages" remedy, see Lande, Single Damages?, supra note 27. These articles conclude 
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tion should greatly exceed their harms because not all antitrust violations 
are detected.39 It follows that another benefit of mRs is that, together with 
the effects of direct purchaser actions, they can help to deter antitrust vi-
olations better. It also follows that those who believe there currently is 
inadequate overall deterrence are reluctant to agree to IBR solutions that 
risk lowering the total amounts paid by firms that violate the antitrust 
laws. 
People holding these beliefs tend to believe that to deter antitrust vi-
olations optimally, an IBR should not permit an offset for damages paid to 
direct purchasers. 4O Several existing state IBRs are consistent with the 
that even in those relatively few antitrust cases that are litigated all the way to "treble damages," when 
the amounts awarded are analyzed correctly, they probably are only at most as large as the damages 
caused by the violations. However, to deter future antitrust violations effectively, treble damages 
really should be higher than actual damages. Existing antitrust remedy levels should therefore be 
raised significantly, and indirect purchaser statutes can help do this. For the specific adjustments that 
should be made to antitrust's nominal "treble damages" awards, see infra note 39. 
See also Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private 
Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1,23 n.91 (1995) ("Treble damages do 
not adjust for these difficulties when the time value of money and other costs are considered. In fact, 
treble damages tum out to be closer to single damages when current losses, litigation costs, and future 
recovery are discounted to present value. H); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Tum of the Twenty-First 
Century: The Matter of Remedies, 91 GEO. L.J. 169, 171 (2002) ("Studies show that treble damages 
really amount approximately to single damages in most circumstances. H). 
Some of these adjustments-such as antitrust's lack of prejudgment interest-apply to other 
areas of law as well. However, others-such as the allocative inefficiency effects of market power-do 
not occur as often. See irifra note 39. 
39. See supra note 7. From a deterrence perspective, damages should be significantly more than 
singlefold to discourage anticompetitive behavior. However, the "treble damages" that currently are 
paid to direct purchasers should be adjusted by a number of factors to arrive at their true magnitude: 
First, damages should be adjusted for the time value of money. . .. Taking this factor into 
account, by itself, probably means that so-called "treble" damages are really only approx-
imately double damages. The allocative inefficiency harms from market power-the dead-
weight loss welfare triangle-are a second "net harm to others" from cartels. Yet, theyap-
parently have never been awarded in an antitrust case. This omission is significant. To 
oversimplify, Judge Frank Easterbrook made a number of standard assumptions and calcu-
lated that, due to the omission from damage awards of this factor alone, "'[t]reble damages' 
are really [only] double the starting point of overcharge plus allocative loss .... " 
Lande, Antitrust Damages Levels, supra note 7, at 337-38 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling 
Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 455 (1985» (foornotes and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). These factors continue: 
Third, the umbrella effects of market power are another virtually unawarded damage from 
market power. . . . Moreover, there are five more adjustments to the so-called "treble 
damages" multiplier that should be made to calculate the net harms to others from an anti-
trust violation. These eight adjustments, combined, show that even those cases that suppo-
sedly award "treble damages" probably only really award damages equal to, at most, one 
times the actual harms caused by the violation. As noted, however, from the perspective of 
optimal deterrence damages really should be at the threefold level. 
Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels, supra note 7, at 338-39 (footnotes omitted). 
Thus, an mR that resulted in a combination of nominal treble damages to direct purchasers 
and another nominal treble damages to indirect purchasers would only result in an actual total of 
roughly double damages, not sixfold damages. For this reason, mRs do not result in duplication or in 
overdeterrence. 
40. There are several state statutes that preclude "duplicative" recovery, but it is difficult to de-
termine whether they are worried about duplication solely on the state level, or duplication between 
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foregoing logic and appear to work well. For example, the current Kansas 
statute, Ch. 50-161(b)-(c), which provides "damages for violation of act," 
is clear: 
(b) Except as provided in K.S.A. 12-205, and amendments there-
to, any person who may be damaged or injured by any agreement, 
monopoly, trust, conspiracy or combination which is declared un-
lawful by any of the acts contained in chapter 50 of the Kansas 
Statutes Annotated, relating to unlawful acts, agreements, mono-
polies, trusts, conspiracies or combinations in restraint of trade, 
shall have a cause of action against any person causing such dam-
age or injury. Such action may be brought by any person who is 
injured in such person's business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden or declared unlawful by this act, regardless of 
whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the 
defendant. The plaintiff in any action commenced hereunder in the 
district court of the county wherein such plaintiff resides, or the 
district court of the county of the defendant's principal place of 
business, may sue for and recover treble the damages sustained. In 
addition, any person who is threatened with injury or additional 
injury by reason of any person's violation of such acts may com-
mence an action in such district court to enjoin any such violation, 
and any damages suffered may be sued for and recovered in the 
same action in addition to injunctive relief. Any suit for injunctive 
relief against a municipality shall be subject to the provisions of 
K.S.A. 12-205, and amendments thereto. 
(c) In any action commenced under this section, the plaintiff may 
be allowed reasonable attorney fees and costs. The remedies pro-
vided herein shall be alternative and in addition to any other reme-
dies now provided by law. 41 
the stale and federal levels. See. e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340.6 (McKinney 2004) ("[TJhe court 
shall take all SlePS necessary to avoid duplicate liability .... "); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2465(b) 
(1999) (same). Do they just apply to claims made by, for example, mUltiple levels of indirect purchas-
ers against the same defendant? Or would they apply to awards to direct purchasers as well, even if 
those direct purchasers recover under federal law? If so, suppose that the direct purchasers settled for 
single damages, rather than treble. Can the indirect purchaser recover anything? Does the direct pur-
chaser claim have to get resolved first to know if the indirect purchaser even has a damages claim 
(i.e., can the indirect purchaser go to trial while the direct purchaser claim remains pending)? What if 
the indirect plaintiffs win first and get treble damages: would they get interpleaded into the direct 
case? What if a defendant wins against the direct purchasers? Would a recovery of anything by an 
indirect purchaser be "duplicative"? 
As these issues suggest, including an "antiduplication" provision raises questions that may 
never be answered, but easily could undermine victims' incentives to assert their claims. 
41. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-161(b)-(c) (2005). 
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A state that wants to amend its existing laws could do so using a 
shorter provision. For example, the following material, based in part on 
the Kansas provision, could be added to a state's antitrust laws: 
The plaintiff in any action commenced hereunder may sue for and 
recover treble the damages sustained. Such action may be brought 
by any person who is a citizen or resident of this State who is in-
jured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden 
or declared unlawful by this Act, regardless whether such person 
dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant. This remedy is an 
additional remedy to any other remedies provided by law, and this 
remedy shall not diminish or offset any other remedy. 
It should be noted that this area of damages law is usually described in 
terms of a concern with the rights of indirect purchasers. Nevertheless, 
the antitrust laws apply equally to violations by buyers as well as to viola-
tions by sellers.42 For this reason an IBR should protect indirect sellers as 
well as indirect purchasers from the harms caused by antitrust violations. 
Cases involving an illegal single-fIrm monopsony or a monopsony cartel 
are much rarer than antitrust violations that involve sellers, but they often 
are of particular concern to farmers, ranchers, and owners of natural re-
sources.43 IBRs should be worded so they apply to all who lose money due 
to antitrust violations, regardless of whether they are purchasers or sellers. 
The above provision is worded to accomplish this. 
Moreover, a state might wish to clarify that the benefIciaries of its 
IBR are only those indirect purchasers that are residents of that state. A 
state IBR should make it clear that the state was only trying to protect its 
citizens, and that it was not overreaching and attempting to protect every 
consumer in the United Sates or to regulate all of the commerce in the 
United States. The immediately preceding alternative is worded to accom-
plish this goal. 
B. IBRs Authorizing Less Than Treble Damages 
An alternative approach would be to authorize indirect purchasers to 
recover an amount less than treble damages-in addition to the treble dam-
42. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 191, 212 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssm.comlso13/papers.cfm?abstracUd= 1113927. 
43. See, e.g., Pease v. Jasper Wyman & Son, 845 A.2d 552 (Me. 2004). This case involved a 
conspiracy to suppress the prices that were paid for wild blueberries. The jury calculated that the 
cartel caused a $56 million underpayment to the growers. See generally Kirkwood & Lande, supra 
note 42. 
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ages received by direct purchasers under the federal antitrust laws.44 While 
these approaches would not provide as much deterrence as one providing 
treble damages, it is a compromise that could be more politically accepta-
ble. There are a number of alternatives that would accomplish this. 
1. Permit indirect purchasers to recover single damages and reasona-
ble attorney fees, in addition to the treble damages recovered by direct 
purchasers: 
The Nebraska antitrust statute, § 59-821 provides: 
Any person who is injured in his or her business or property by 
any other person or persons by a violation of sections 59-801 to 
59-831, whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly 
with the defendant, may bring a civil action . . . and shall recover 
actual damages . . . and the costs of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 45 
Variations of this approach also are used in Arkansas and Oregon. 46 
2. Allow indirect purchasers to receive mandatory single damages, 
and permit the court, in its discretion, to award treble damages instead. 
This remedy would be in addition to any award given to direct purchasers. 
For example: 
Any person who is injured in his or her business or property by 
any other person or persons by a violation of this Section, whether 
such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, 
may bring a civil action and shall recover actual damages and the 
costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The Court 
shall have the discretion to award treble damages to anyone ftling 
suit under this Section [if the Court fmds this would be in the in-
terests of justice] [if the violators engaged in willful or flagrant 
conduct]. 
This compromise might be politically acceptable in some jurisdictions. 
It would, however, lead to less deterrence than an approach allowing indi-
rect purchasers to sue for treble damages. It also would have less predic-
tability than an IBR which provides that damages automatically will be 
44. An extreme version of these alternatives would require that the total recovered by both direct 
and indirect purchasers total treble damages; i.e., there would be no increase. For example, the alter-
natives discussed in Part I.A, supra, could accomplish this if the antiduplication provisions were 
omitted. 
45. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 59-821 (LexisNexis 2004). 
46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-315(b)(1) (2009); OR. REv. STAT. § 646.545 (2007). 
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trebled, and the uncertainty over whether a prevailing plaintiff would re-
ceive single or treble damages would cause plaintiffs to be less likely to 
file suit. Variations of this approach were perhaps enacted with the goal of 
guiding judicial discretion; existing state legislation provides that indirect 
purchasers will receive single damages unless the violators engaged in 
"willful or flagrant [conduct]" (Texas)47 or have a "malicious intent to 
injure" (Massachusetts).48 However, apparently no court has ever used its 
discretion to award treble damages in these situations. For this reason, as 
a practical matter this type of solution would be similar to one that awards 
only single damages. 
3. Permit indirect purchasers to sue for single damages and also award 
prejudgment interest. This would be a remedy in addition to those availa-
ble to direct purchasers. 
By analogy, Texas does not permit indirect purchaser suits, but does 
provide: "Any person ... may sue any person ... and shall recover ac-
tual damages sustained, interest on actual damages for the period begin-
ning on the date of service of such person's pleading .... "49 The ABA's 
February 2004 discussion draft also included the provision that rule of 
reason violations should result in single damages plus prejudgment inter-
est. 50 The AMC considered this possibility at length, but in the end re-
jected this option. 51 
An award of single damages plus prejudgment interest would not pro-
vide as much deterrence as treble damages. Depending upon the length of 
the antitrust violation, the length of the trial, and the prevailing interest 
rate, this provision might increase the total award by roughly twenty to 
thirty percent.52 Even though this is much less than treble damages, a state 
legislature that believed a new law allowing indirect purchasers to sue for 
treble damages would constitute excessive deterrence or duplication might 
instead be willing to enact legislation allowing single damages plus pre-
judgment interest. 
47. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § IS.21(a)(1) (Vernon 2002) ("[I]f the trier of fact finds that 
the unlawful conduct was willful or flagrant, it shall increase the recovery to threefold the damages 
sustained and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee .... "). 
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 12 (2006). 
49. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a)(I) (Vernon 2002). 
50. See American Bar Association's Antitrust Remedies Task Force Legislative Proposal, Discus-
sion Draft (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter ABA Discussion Draft]. 
51. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 246 (2007) [herei-
nafter AMC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.eduJamc/reportJecommendation 
lamc_finaI Jeport.pdf. 
52. There is evidence showing that the average cartel lasts for roughly seven to eight years and 
prejudgment litigation requires another four to five years. See Lande, Single Damages?, supra note 
27, at 130-34 (computing the lost prejudgment interest due to these time lags). However, in recent 
years this time lag has had less impact due to current low interest rates. 
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4. Permit indirect purchasers in per se cases to recover treble damages 
and permit indirect purchasers in rule of reason cases to recover single 
damages. 
This would be a different type of compromise.53 Even though both per 
se and rule of reason offenses54 harm consumers, this compromise posits 
that potential per se violators are more likely to be on notice that they are 
about to commit an antitrust violation, and for this reason it seems fairer 
to penalize them more. Moreover, per se violations are unquestionably 
anticompetitive and should be deterred more vigorously than rule of rea-
son violations. A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that there is 
no clear line between per se and rule of reason violations, 55 so this ap-
proach could lead to less predictability for businesses and consumers.56 
This uncertainty also could lead to fewer suits being filed and therefore to 
less deterrence than an approach that awarded treble damages for all viola-
tions. 
This approach is used in Colorado for indirect government purchas-
ers,57 and it was suggested for discussion by the ABA Damages Task 
Force in February 2004.58 
c. Extremely Limited Illinois Brick Repealers 
A much more limited approach would be to repeal Illinois Brick only 
for extremely narrow or specific purposes, such as only for the indirect 
purchasers in specific industries. For example, Maryland recently enacted 
the following IBR, which is among the most limited in the nation: 
53. See ABA Discussion Draft, supra note 50. 
54. For a general discussion of the differences between per se and rule of reason violations see 
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRlMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK 202-17 (West Group ed., 2000). 
55. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999). The per se/rule of reason quagmire 
could even be exacerbated by this type of provision. If a law awarded treble damages for per se cases 
and single damages for rule of reason cases, judges might treat cases under the rule of reason if they 
believe that treble damages are excessive. This could distort the development of the law and compound 
the difficulties of plaintiffs in establishing liability. 
56. It might be possible to specify by legislation which offenses would merit treble damages. But 
limiting treble damages to, for example, "horizontal price fixing," "horizontal behavior that directly 
affects prices," or "horizontal behavior that has many of the characteristics of price fixing" would 
give rise to disputes over what these terms mean and to which cases these terms apply. 
57. Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992, COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-4-111(2) (2002). 
58. The ABA Discussion draft, supra note 50, reads: 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, is amended in subsection (a) by adding after 
"shall recover" the following: 
(i), for injuries by reason of anything that is found to be a per se violation of the anti-
trust laws, threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, and (ii), for injuries by reason of anything else that is for-
bidden by the antitrust laws, the damages by him sustained thereby, interest thereon 
computed from the date [on which suit is filed] [on which such injury is sustained] at 
a rate that will provide the present value of such damages, and the cost of suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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In any action brought by the Attorney General . . . a person that 
sells, distributes, or otherwise disposes of any drug, medicine, 
cosmetic, food, food additive, or commercial feed ... or medical 
device: 
(1) May not assert as a defense that the person did not deal direct-
1y with the person on whose behalf the action is brought; and 
(2) May prove, as a partial or complete defense against a damage 
claim, in order to avoid duplicative liability, that all or any part of 
an alleged overcharge ultimately was passed on to another person 
by a purchaser or seller in the chain of manufacture, production, 
or distribution who paid the alleged overcharge. 59 
Thus, in Maryland indirect purchasers of drugs, etc. can recover, but 
only if the Maryland Attorney General files suit, and defendants are per-
mitted to assert a Hanover Shoe60 defense that the alleged victims passed 
along the overcharge to the next level in the distribution chain. 
It is difficult to justify confining an IBR to just a single industry. If it 
makes sense to permit consumer victims who purchase indirectly from 
pharmaceutical cartels to sue for damages, it also should make sense to 
give this right to similarly situated victims of other cartels. Nevertheless, 
an IBR proposal might receive more political support in some States if it 
were narrowly tailored towards the goal of helping consumers in certain 
situations, such as the case of senior citizens and others who pay large 
pharmaceutical and related medical costs. This type of legislation might be 
introduced as a part of sectoral legislation rather than be advanced as a 
separate antitrust bill. 
Other types of narrow IBR legislation could empower individuals but 
not classes to sue,61 could create a remedy for consumer-victims but not 
for business-victims, or could only permit overcharged government units 
to recover. 62 
II. OPTIONS INVOLVING STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
There is a widespread belief that some plaintiffs' attorneys, especially 
those filing consumer class action suits,63 bring irresponsible suits for the 
59. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 21-1114 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). 
60. See Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
61. The New York law might be limited in this way. See Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. BuS. LAW 
§ 340.6, as interpreted by Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012,1017 (N.Y. 2007). 
62. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-209(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005). 
63. F.T.C. Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, testifying before the Antitrust Modernization Com-
mission Conference on June 8, 2006, opined: "Treble Damage Class Actions .... In the real world, 
they are almost as scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are generally at issue in the cases. The 
plaintiffs' lawyers who play in this game ... stand to win almost regardless of the merits of the case." 
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purpose of extorting unjustifiable recoveries from defendants. They are 
. sometimes said to negotiate sweetheart settlements that result in relatively 
worthless coupons or discounts, or trivial refunds to injured consumers, 
while generating very large attorneys' fees.64 In theory, judges are sup-
posed to prevent this type of abuse. Unfortunately, judges do not always 
have the necessary time or expertise to do this effectively. A state which 
believed this to be a serious concern might decide to enact an IBR that 
only permits its attorney general to file indirect purchaser suits. An alter-
native would be to give the state attorneys general some oversight role in 
the private suits that are filed. This type of provision would help bring a 
neutral, well-informed, consumer-oriented party into the situation. 
A drawback to this approach is that many or most state attorneys gen-
eral would not have the resources to detect and pursue these cases often 
enough to protect their citizens adequately and deter most antitrust viola-
tions. Moreover, this exclusivity could put additional political pressures on 
attorneys general. Attorneys general have considerable discretion over 
which cases to bring, and their decision to bring or not bring a case opens 
them to charges of political favoritism. Attorneys general can better pro-
tect themselves against this charge if they can point out that aggrieved 
parties have the right to bring their own antitrust cases. If only the attor-
neys general can bring cases, they might be more subject to pressure to 
bring bad cases when important groups argue that they have no other re-
course. Attorneys general could also face pressure not to bring cases on 
behalf of unpopular groups, or groups that supported a different political 
party. 
Regardless of the extent to which these considerations are correct, this 
Part contains a number of IBR options that highlight the authority and role 
of the state attorneys general. 
1. Only permit the state attorney general to sue, by the use of a parens 
patriae action, on behalf of any aggrieved indirect purchasers in their 
state. 
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Modernization 
Commission Conference (June 8, 2(06), available at hnp://www.ftc.gov/speeches/roschlRosen-
AMC%20Remarks.June 8.final.pdf, at 9-10. 
64. See Lande & Davis, supra note 11, at 884. Despite this widespread belief, there is no evi-
dence that these abuses occur a significant percentage of the time. For evidence that more than $18 
billion in cash was returned to victims of antitrust violations through private litigation, see id. passim. 
Moreover, plaintiffs' attorneys might respond that preventing private suits would be a counte-
rintuitive remedy for the perceived problems. To protect consumers from receiving too little based on 
the allegedly deficient work of private counsel, private counsel are prevented from obtaining any 
benefit at all for consumers! Plaintiffs' counsel likely would counter that allowing state attorneys 
general to bring cases in addition to any private actions, and allowing them to intervene in private 
actions to protect class members, would be a much better solution. 
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Most state attorneys general have parens patriae authority to sue gen-
erally on behalf of victimized consumers within their states. For example, 
the Hawaii Antitrust Statute provides: 
The attorney general . . . may bring a class action on behalf of 
consumers based on [violations of this Section]. Actions brought 
under this subsection shall be brought as parens patriae on behalf 
of natural persons residing in the State, to secure threefold damag-
es for injuries sustained by such natural persons to their property 
by reason of any violation of this chapter. 65 
However, defendants in actions brought under some state antitrust statutes 
might argue that this authority does not exist in their state. It therefore 
could be desirable for states where this authority is in doubt to enact a law 
similar to the one in effect in Hawaii. More specifically, a state could 
enact a law making it clear that this parens patriae authority can be in-
voked on behalf of indirect purchasers. For example, the Nevada Unfair 
Trade Practices statute provides that: 
The attorney general may bring a civil action for any violation of 
the provisions of this chapter ... [a]s parens patriae of the per-
sons residing in this state, with respect to damages sustained di-
rectly or indirectly by such persons, or ... as a representative of 
a class . . . of persons . . . who have been damaged directly or in-
directly . . . .66 
2. Permit the state attorney general to sue, but only when the state or a 
local government is the indirect purchaser. 
For example, the Arkansas Unfair Practices Statute provides, in § 4-
75-212, civil actions and settlements by the attorney general: 
(a) In addition to the other remedies provided in this subchapter, 
whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any per-
son is engaging, has engaged, or is about to engage in any act or 
practice declared unlawful by this subchapter, the Attorney Gener-
al may bring an action in the name of the state against that person 
... [and is authorized] 
(3) To recover on behalf of the state and its agencies actual dam-
ages or restitution for loss incurred either directly or indirectly; 
and ... 
65. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4S0-14(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2OOS). 
66. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 59SA.160(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2004). 
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(l)(A) The circuit court shall award the Attorney General as mon-
etary relief actual damages sustained or restitution for loss in-
curred as a result of the violations of this subchapter, and the cost 
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 67 
In some states there might be no chance of passing a general repealer. A 
narrow repealer, limited to overcharges on government purchases, might 
be the best IBR that could be enacted, at least at a particular time. Note 
that the Arkansas statute, above, only provides for single damages in these 
situations . 
3. Permit individual indirect purchasers to sue for damages, but not 
permit class action suits by indirect purchasers, except by the state Attor-
ney General acting on behalf of consumers. 
Illinois law provides: 
No provision of this Act shall deny any person who is an indirect 
purchaser the right to sue for damages. Provided, however, that in 
any case in which claims are asserted against a defendant by both 
direct and indirect purchasers, the court shall take all steps neces-
sary to avoid duplicate liability for the same injury including trans-
fer and consolidation of all actions. Provided further that no per-
son other than the Attorney General of this State shall be autho-
rized to maintain a class action in any court of this State for indi-
rect purchasers asserting claims under this Act. 68 
This option could be adopted if many within a state believed that abuses by 
plaintiffs class action attorneys were particularly rampant in situations 
involving class action cases. In cases involving individual plaintiffs, by 
contrast, the purchasers are more likely to prevent counsel from engaging 
in the more egregious types of abuses that allegedly occur, such as settling 
for worthless coupons plus large attorneys' fees. 
A problem with this approach, however, is that it is likely to result in 
under-enforcement. An individual plaintiffs damages, especially when the 
purchasers are consumers, often would be far too small to justify fIling a 
lawsuit. While some large businesses might purchase enough pharmaceuti-
cals, vitamins, or computer software to justify filing a lawsuit, it could be 
rare for small businesses or consumers to do so. Many believe that a ban 
on private class action suits renders an IBR almost useless. 69 
67. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-212(a)(3), (b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2009). 
68. 740 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 1017(2) (West Supp. 2009). 
69. See the analysis presented by Jay L. Himes, Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Att'y Gen. 
of the State of N.Y., Protecting-and Advancing-Consumer Interests: When the Antitrust "Reform" 
Engine Kicks Into Gear (Nov. 5, 2003), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/2 
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4. Pennit private suits, but make the State Attorney General a poten-
tial or mandatory advisor in consumer class action cases: 
Plaintiffs shall notify the attorney general about the filing [alterna-
tively, the certification] of any class action containing purchasers 
from that State that involves antitrust allegations. All parties in 
these cases shall send copies of all filings in these cases to the at-
torney general. The attorney general may, at his or her discretion, 
intervene or file an amicus brief that gives the presiding Judge his 
or her opinion as to the appropriateness of any proposed settlement 
of the case. 
The Texas statute contains a variation of this, in § 15.21(c): 
Any person or governmental entity filing suit under this section 
shall mail a copy of the complaint to the Attorney General of Tex-
as. The attorney general as representative of the public may inter-
vene in the action . . . . The penalty for failure to comply with this 
subsection shall be a monetary [me not in excess of $200. 70 
This provision could give the state attorney general an explicit and perhaps 
crucial advisory role in private antitrust class action direct purchaser 
and/or indirect purchaser suits. Currently, some attorneys general can 
offer advisory opinions in antitrust cases, but this is not commonly done. 
This provision would facilitate and encourage their commenting and inter-
vening. It would also make the parties conscious that their settlements 
might be second-guessed by their state attorney general, and this could 
have beneficial effects. This type of provision71 could give the attorney 
general the option of giving an opinion as to the adequacy of any settle-
ment to the presiding judge. Moreover, the Class Action Fairness Act al-
ready mandates this type of notification for a large percentage of class 
action cases.72 A problem with making this comment procedure mandato-
82.pdf, at 19-23. 
70. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(c) (Vernon 2005). 
71. [d. The $200 fine in the Texas statute cited above, however, is not likely to have much effect. 
A substantial increase would seem warranted. 
72. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1715 (2005). With few exceptions, consumer indirect purchaser cases 
will only be viable as class actions. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (amending 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1332, 1453) expanded the basis for removing class actions from state court, and currently very few 
indirect purchaser class actions will be able to proceed in state court. Accordingly, state courts will 
have very few opportunities to shape the interpretation of state mRs. States should keep in mind that 
the mRs they enact are likely to be interpreted mostly by federal courts, which will involve a "through 
the looking glass" attempt to guess how state courts would rule in cases that they are now never going 
to see. Alternatively, interpretation questions sometimes could be certified to the state's highest court. 
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ry, however, would be that many or most states would not have the neces-
sary resources to analyze very many class action cases carefully. 
III. MAJOR SUPPLEMENTAL IILINOIS BRICK REPEALER OPTIONS 
A. Damage Markup Presumptions and Findings 
The size of the markup or overcharge caused by an antitrust violation 
often changes as it is passed along in the distribution chain.73 Just as it 
usually is difficult to determine which level in the distribution chain ab-
sorbed what percentage of the illegal overcharges, it is similarly difficult 
to determine whether and how these overcharges to the direct purchasers 
change as they pass on to successive levels of indirect purchasers. 74 Do 
direct purchasers ever absorb all or most of the increase? Does a markup 
by a cartel usually get passed along dollar for dollar to the next level? Or 
do markups get passed along on a percentage basis?75 Or is the pass-
through rate somewhere in between a dollar markup and a percentage 
markup? For example, suppose wholesalers normally charge $1.00 and 
their retailers normally charge consumers $2.00. When a wholesale cartel 
raises its prices from $1.00 to $1.20, do the retailers on average raise their 
prices from $2.00 to $2.20, to $2.40, or to some figure in-between $2.20 
73. For an insightful analysis of many related issues, see Hovenkamp, supra note 29, passim. 
74. As Judge Posner observed, "[t]racing a price hike through successive resales ... is famously 
difficult." In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1997). But see Roger 
D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modem Antitrust Standing 
Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 29 (1999). If a group of manufacturers were to fix prices on 
goods sold to fabricators who sell to distributors who sell to retailers who sell to consumers, estimat-
ing the amount passed on at each stage would be a daunting task. An indirect purchaser, however, 
need not do this. An indirect purchaser must estimate only the "but for" price that it should have paid, 
which is a far less exacting exercise than apportioning the overcharge throughout the entire chain of 
distribution. 
75. Robert Steiner shows that when there is a uniform upstream price increase, retailers (and 
wholesalers) reliably pass through more than the upstream dollar overcharge. For example, when a 
manufacturer cartel raises prices to retailers by $1.00, their retailers typically raise prices to consum-
ers by more than $1.00. (By contrast, when upstream firms hike prices by different amounts, the 
passthrough can be less than, or more than, 100% of the cartel's price increase). Steiner demonstrated 
this by analyzing the cigarette industry. In 1998, the tobacco industry reached a far-reaching deal with 
the states requiring cigarette manufacturers to make large annual contributions to the States to fund 
various antismoking programs. This caused cigarette makers to boost their prices. All producers un-
iformly followed Philip Morris's price hikes. Prior to these manufacturers' price increases, the trade 
margin (wholesaler plus retailer margins) was about 17%. Steiner showed that after several annual 
factory price increases, the trade margin remained almost 17%. Thus, the combined factory price 
increases of an average of 63 cents per pack caused retail cigarette prices to rise by an average of 76 
cents per pack. See Robert L. Steiner, The Third Relevant Market, 45 ANTiTRUST BULL. 719, 745-58 
(2000). 
See also Michael P. Lynch, Why Economists Are Wrong to Neglect Retailing and How Stein-
er's Theory Provides an Explanation of Imponant Regularities, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 919, 939 (2004). 
Dr. Lynch analyzes Steiner's cigarette study plus other examples, including his own empirical re-
search. From this he develops a formal model which "implies that general upstream cost increases will 
always be passed through to consumers at a rate of more than 100%." 
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and $2.40? In other words, does an initial cartel markup of 20C grow to 
40C, stay at 20C, or does it decrease to lOC as its impact is felt along the 
distribution chain? 
The calculation of the amounts of the markups and their allocation be-
tween different types or levels of purchasers currently is done on a case-
by-case basis. An alternative has been suggested in the 2008 European 
Union White Paper on Damages, which contains a presumption76 that the 
entire overcharge is passed on to end users.77 A similar presumption-
which could be rebuttable or conclusive-could, in appropriate United 
States cases, save litigation costs and time, increase business certainly, and 
optimally provide potential plaintiffs with a sufficient incentive to sue the 
violators. 
Moreover, without this type of presumption it can be especially diffi-
cult for injured plaintiffs to demonstrate the amount of the passed through 
overcharge when the overcharge only affected a component or ingredient. 
The effects are often very difficult to trace, especially when the compo-
nent is only a modest part of the cost of the final product. 78 The following 
options attempt to create a presumption to simplify the issues in a relative-
ly fair and litigation-saving manner. 79 
1. Include a presumption that there has been a percentage passthrough: 
It [rebuttably shall be presumed] [is conclusively decided] that all 
changes in price due to an antitrust violation are passed along to 
the next level in the distribution chain as the same percentage 
change in price as the percentage change that was received by that 
level in the distribution chain. 
A presumption that overcharges were passed on to the next level in the 
distribution chain at the same percentage increase would greatly simplify 
and speed up litigation, and for this reason would benefit victims. For 
76. The term "presumption" can have different meanings. This Article assumes that a presump-
tion would count as the equivalent of a type of evidence, against which the parties' evidence would be 
balanced. Any party desiring to overcome the presumption would have the burden of persuading the 
court that the presumption was unwarranted. An alternative type of presumption would be an "explod-
ing" presumption that would lose all force in the face of any significant countervailing evidence. This 
type of presumption would not have much value. 
77. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., White Paper on Damnges for Reach of the Ee Antitrust 
Rules § 2.6 (Feb. 4, 2008), available at hnp:llec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actions dam-
ages/files_white yaper/whitepaper _en. pdf. 
78. Professor Page does not believe that ingredient suits should be permitted even though consum-
ers ultimately will absorb the overcharges, because "their harm cannot be calculated in practice." See 
Page, supra note 15, at 741. 
79. This category is very similar to the options in Part III.C, infra, which are concerned with the 
split of damages between direct and indirect purchasers. However, this Part is concerned with what 
happens to the size of the overcharge as it gets passed from level to level. 
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example, if a cartel increased prices by 20 % to its direct purchasers, this 
would mean that every subsequent seller would be presumed also to have 
increased the prices of their products by 20 %, so the end users would be 
presumed to pay an additional 20% for their products. This would be the 
equivalent of a presumption that the retailers kept their same margin and 
markup; if the retailers doubled the wholesale price before the antitrust 
violation occurred, they would be presumed to double the wholesale price 
after the violation occurred. 80 This presumption could be rebuttable (one 
that could be overcome by either side) or it could be declared irrebuttable 
and conclusive. 
Defendants, however, surely would consider a 100% percentage-based 
pass through presumption to be too strongly proconsumer. They would, for 
example, object to the presumption that if the direct purchasers were over-
charged by 20 %, they also would mark up their prices to the next level by 
20%. The following variation would, by contrast, favor defendants more: 
2. Include a presumption that there has been a dollar-for-dollar pass-
through: 
There is a [presumption] [conclusive finding] that all changes in 
price due to antitrust violations were passed on to every subse-
quent level in the distribution chain as an amount equal to the 
same change, in dollars and cents, as the change directly caused 
by the antitrust violation and charged to the first purchaser of the 
product or service in question. 
This proposal would mean that the total recoverable overcharges would 
not be considered to increase or decrease in amount at any subsequent 
level of the distribution chain. Rather the presumption would be that the 
existing markup in dollars and cents was simply passed to the subsequent 
indirect purchasers. Suppose, for example, the competitive price of a 
product was $1.00 at the manufacturer level and $2.00 at the retail level. 
Suppose a manufacturer cartel increased its prices from $1.00 to $1.20. 
This alternative would create a presumption that the retail price had in-
creased by $0.20 (from $2.00 to $2.20). This would in effect mean that 
the commercial intermediates had decreased their markup rule from 100% 
down to 83 %, a more conservative assumption.81 
80. Many retailers rely upon rules of thumb (i.e., double the wholesale price of each product). 
This is simple to administer, especially in fields like grocery retailing which involve thousands of 
different products. In many cases it would be too difficult for the retailer to decide whether to increase 
the price of one of its products by 80% instead of by 100% following a price rise that might have 
come from an antitrust violation instead of, for example, a rise in input costs. 
81. Alternatively, an mR could contain a presumption in-between the dollar and percentage pre-
sumptions: 
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3. Include a presumption that any overcharge in the ingredient or 
component product or service was passed on: 
There [is a presumption] [shall be a conclusive fmding] that each 
level in a product's distribution chain passed on any and all incre-
ments in its costs due to an increase in the cost of an ingredient or 
a component product or service that was caused by a violation of 
anything in this Act. This amount will be presumed to be equal to 
the change in the cost, in dollars and cents, of the ingredient or 
component product or service to its flrst purchaser. 
This presumption could be worded in terms of dollars or in terms of per-
centages. For example, suppose that consumers purchased personal com-
puters containing DRAM, and that the price of the DRAM was increased 
by $25 due to illegal collusion. Suppose also that the personal computers 
containing the supracompetitively priced DRAM were assembled and then 
sold by several successive layers of sellers, and that consumers paid a pre-
collusion price of $1,000 for their personal computer. This type of provi-
sion could create a presumption that the fmal purchasers of the personal 
computers (who purchased their computer for, say, $1,025) paid an extra 
$25 due to the collusion of the DRAM manufacturers. 82 
B. Proof of Damages Provisions 
Often the proof problems associated with determining standing and 
calculating damages in indirect purchaser cases are so formidable that the 
judicial system wastes considerable time and resources analyzing these 
issues, and the court often comes to relatively unpredictable and unreliable 
results. 83 These problems often are especially acute in component part 
cases84 and in class action cases. 85 An IBR could contain presumptions or 
conclusions that would help to overcome these proof problems. 86 
There is a [presumption] [conclusive finding] that all increases in price due to antitrust vi-
olations were passed to the next level in the distribution chain as an amount in-between the 
cartel's dollar markup and the percentage markup imposed by the cartel. 
Suppose, for example, the competitive price of a product was $1.00 at the manufacturer level and 
$2.00 at the retail level. Suppose that a manufacturer cartel increased its price from $1.00 to $1.20. 
This alternative would mandate a presumption that the retail price had increased by at least $0.20 (to 
$2.20), and possibly by as much as 20% (to $2.40). The court would determine where, in the $0.20 to 
$0.40 range, the markup to the subsequent level was. While this approach would narrow the uncertain-
ty for all concerned, it would not save litigation costs. 
82. These are simplified and highly stylized versions of the facts contained in In re DRAM Anti-
trust LitigaJion, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (2008). 
83. See ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 139-50. 
84. Id. at 179-81. 
85. Id. at 151-209. See id. at 156-64 for an excellent discussion of problems involving the nume-
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1. Provide that standing should not be denied because the products or 
services in question were components in products or services purchased by 
victims. 
Antitrust standing in indirect purchaser cases is governed by Associated 
General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters,S7 where the 
Court denied a union standing in part because: "the Union was neither a 
consumer nor a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained."ss In 
addition, 
the nature of the Union's injury, the tenuous and speculative cha-
racter of the relationship between the alleged antitrust violation 
and the Union's alleged injury, the potential for duplicative recov-
ery or complex apportionment of damages, and the existence of 
more direct victims of the alleged conspiracyOweigh heavily 
against judicial enforcement of the Union's antitrust claim. S9 
The Associated General Contractor factors have sometimes been ap-
plied to deny victims standing because they purchased products whose 
major components were the subject of an antitrust violation. For example, 
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig. 90 held: 
that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that plaintiffs' injury is 
"of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent," because 
the law requires that plaintiffs be participants in the relevant mar-
ket alleged, and plaintiffs had failed to allege that they were either 
consumers or participants in the market for DRAM. Rather, they 
had alleged only that they were consumers in secondary markets 
(e.g., computer markets) incidental to the market for DRAM it-
self. 91 
rosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements. 
86. Some of these provisions also couId be utilized in direct purchaser legislation. 
87. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
88. Id. at 539. 
89. Id. at 545. The Court also noted: "The indirectness of the alleged injury also implicates the 
strong interest, identified in our prior cases, in keeping the scope of complex antitrust trials within 
judicially manageable limits." Id. at 543. 
90. 536 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2(08). See also In re Graphic Processing Units Antitrust 
Litig., 253 F.R.D. 478 (N.D. Cal 2(08) (denying indirect purchaser class for component related 
antitrust claims). 
91. In re Dynamite Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 536 F. Supp. at 1136 (footnote 
omitted) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs alleged that even though the purchasers of computers were not 
"participants in the relevant market for DRAM," they should be given standing so long as they were 
in a related market (such as the market for computers containing the affected DRAM), that was "inex-
tricably intertwined" with the market containing the violation and also because purchasers of products 
containing supracompetitively priced components are "tantamount" to being in the same market as the 
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If followed, this decision would deny standing in every indirect purchaser 
component case. 
A state might well conclude that the reasoning and result of this case is 
contrary to the overall purpose of the antitrust laws. It is one thing for a 
court to conclude that unions were not meant to have antitrust standing, 
under the theory that unions were not the type of entity the antitrust laws 
were meant to protect. But in light of the consumer protection mission of 
the antitrust laws,92 a state might well decide that purchasers of computers 
containing DRAM (or other component parts whose prices were increased 
artificially by illegal collusion) deserve the protection of the antitrust laws. 
A state might be willing to tolerate some complexity in the damages analy-
sis in order to allow final consumers to recover. These states might wish 
to confer standing upon these victims by the following type of provision: 
A court shall award standing to every purchaser of a final product 
containing a component part that has been the subject of an anti-
trust violation without regard to whether these purchasers are con-
sumers of, or participants in, the markets that were the subject of 
the antitrust violation. 
This provision would not, of course, confer standing upon every indirect 
purchaser regardless of how remote they were from the violation because 
the remaining Associated General Contractor requirements (that the injury 
be nonspeculative, nonduplicative, and not overly complex93) would re-
main. 
2. Encourage use of a class-wide basis approach for damages calcula-
tions 
A state could simplify and streamline litigation by enacting a law 
which provides that class action damages will be figured on a class-wide 
basis, with damages awarded in proportion to the ratio of an individual's 
purchases or sales to that of the entire class. Washington, D.C. has 
adopted this approach: 
In any class action ... the fact of injury and the amount of dam-
ages sustained by the members of the class may be proven on a 
class-wide basis, without requiring proof of such matters by each 
individual member of the class. The percentage of total damages 
attributable to a member of such class shall be the same as the ra-
component itself. [d. at 1137. Their standing was, however, denied. [d. 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30. 
93. See 459 U.S. at 543-45. 
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tio of such member's purchases or sales to the purchases or sales 
of the class as a whole. 94 
A shorter alternative would be: 
In any class action the class members' fact of injury and total 
amount of damages may be proven in the aggregate. Such aggre-
gate damages shall be allocated among class members in a fair and 
equitable manner in a posttrial proceeding before the court without 
a jury. 
The individualized proof of damages that courts can require makes class-
wide damages calculations overly burdensome and lengthy. This simplify-
ing provision is meant to deal with these potentially fatal problems that 
effectively can deny recovery to victims of antitrust violations. 95 A draw-
back to this approach over one that more strictly insists damages be de-
termined on an individual basis is that under this approach some purchas-
ers would be overrewarded while others would be underrewarded. Over-
all, however, this provision should help significantly from a deterrence 
perspective. 
3. Provide that proof of a violation, or of aggregate damages to the 
indirect purchaser class as a whole, is sufficient to certify the class. 
As noted earlier, it can be extremely difficult to show whether and to 
what extent damages are passed through the distribution chain. One rela-
tively straightforward way to deal with the "fact of injury" issue compo-
nent of this problem would be for a law to include a provision providing: 
For purposes of class certification, the court shall conclusively 
find that every class member has been significantly harmed by an 
antitrust violation involving a final product or the components of a 
final product that the class members have purchased, regardless of 
whether these class members are direct purchasers or indirect pur-
chasers of the products or the components that were the subject of 
the antitrust violation. 
A milder version would allow class certification when the plaintiffs 
demonstrate "on a generalized basis that [the purported class's] members 
absorbed at least some portion of the alleged overcharges. "96 Therefore, so 
94. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4508 (2005). This section was applied successfully in Goda v. Abbott 
Labs., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 71,730, at 79,141 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 1997). 
95. See ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 151-209. 
96. B.W.1. Custom Kitchen y. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1341, 1352 (Cal. App. 
Dist. 1 1987). See, for example, In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Ac-
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long as plaintiffs can show that some damages were incurred by indirect 
purchasers as a whole, the class can be certified and plaintiffs need not 
prove the magnitude of harm. This provision would not, however, deal 
with the actual calculation of damages to particular plaintiffs. 
A related issue arises when some courts refuse to certify classes be-
cause some class members passed on more of the illegal overcharges than 
other class members, or some class members who were direct purchasers 
might have been able to pass on the entirety of the overcharge.97 
A court shall not deny class certification when every class member 
is the direct or indirect purchaser of a product or service that was 
the subject of an antitrust violation on the grounds that the class 
members have been harmed different amounts by the violation. 
The court shall certify the class regardless of whether particular 
class members absorbed all of the illegal overcharges, part or none 
of the illegal overcharges, or whether some class members might 
have marked up the illegal overcharges and increased their profits 
due to the illegal activity. 
Suppose, for example, that a cartel raised its wholesale price from $100 to 
$120 in an industry where the retailers sold the products for $200 before 
the collusion occurred.98 This provision would avoid the court getting 
bogged down, at the class certification stage, in the question of how much 
of the overcharge particular retailers absorbed, or whether they made a 
profit or took a loss as a result of the collusion. 
4. Presume that purchasers affected by violations were harmed by a 
specified small amount. 
The Kansas99 and the Tennessee IBRs provide that antitrust victims can 
recover "the full consideration or sum paid by [the person] for any goods 
... the sale of which is controlled by [an illegal] combination or trust. "100 
These states' approaches can be thought of as equivalent to a legislative 
determination that prices are likely to rise by an average of approximately 
tions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N. Y. 1971), and discussion in Chris S. Coutroulis & D. Matthew Allen, 
The Pass-on Problem in Indirect Purchaser Gass Litigation, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 179, 190-96 
(1999). 
97. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharrn., Inc., 350 F. 3d 1181, 1193 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Ha-
nover Shoe does not hold that this net economic gain [earned by some, but not all, of the direct pur-
chasers] must be ignored or overlooked by a court when determining whether [class certification 
under] Rule 23 has been satisfied. "). 
98. If the retailers always doubled their costs, the "cost plus" exception would apply. See supra 
note 2. 
99. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-115 (2005) (allowing victims to recover the "full consideration" paid 
by victims to the illegal "combination"). 
100. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-106 (2005) (permitting recovery of consideration as remedy for 
damages). 
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50% due to an antitrust violation, and then to a payment of treble damages 
(treble damages on a 50% price rise would equal the supracompetitive cost 
of the items in question). 101 The 50 % presumption that Kansas and Ten-
nessee have implicitly chosen is somewhat higher than the results of a re-
cent comprehensive survey of cartel overcharges, which found that, histor-
ically, cartels in the United States have raised prices by an average amount 
of 31-49%.102 To more accurately compensate antitrust victims, a statute 
containing this type of presumption should choose a figure smaller than 
50%: 
After a violation and the fact of damages have been proven, con-
sumer end users of the product or service in question shall conclu-
sively be presumed to have been injured, and the amount of the in-
jury shall be the larger of 10% of the amount consumers paid for 
their products or services, or the amount by which plaintiffs can 
demonstrate they were injured. 
A variation would create only a rebuttable presumption: 
After a violation has been proven, consumer end users of the 
product or service in question shall be presumed to have been in-
jured, and the amount of the injury shall be presumed to be the 
larger of 10 % of the amount by which the violators raised or lo-
wered the prices of the products or services in question, or the 
amount by which plaintiffs can demonstrate that they were injured. 
Another variation specifically would apply to component parts as well: 
After a violation has been proven involving a final product or any 
component thereof, consumer end users of the product or service 
in question shall be presumed to have been injured, and the 
amount of the injury shall be presumed to be the larger of 10% of 
the amount by which the violators raised or lowered the prices of 
the products or services in question, or the components of the 
products or services in question, or the amount by which plaintiffs 
can demonstrate they were injured. 
101. Suppose a good were competitively priced at $100, and a cartel then raised its price by $50, to 
$150. If the awarded damages were $150, this would be treble damages (Le., three times the $50 
increment). 
102. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications 
for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TuL. L. REv. 513, 513 (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=787907. The range of figures comes from differ-
ent data sets. 
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Although the empirical results could justify a presumption of 30%, these 
examples have instead used a 10% figure. This was chosen in part because 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission penalties for criminal cartel violations 
presume that cartels raise prices by 10 % .103 Moreover, since 79 % of the 
cartels in the preceding survey raised prices by more than 10 %,104 this 
presumption also was chosen because it would be a relatively conservative 
one. 
5. Encourage courts to use statistical sampling techniques to determine 
aggregate class damages. 
It has been suggested that some courts are overly hostile to the use of 
statistical sampling techniques to determine the average amounts that class 
members paid in overcharges. lOS Moreover, courts in at least one state, 
Michigan, apparently require proof of damages for every individual. 106 If 
applied correctly, however, statistical sampling techniques can be both fair 
and helpful in calculating damages. 107 This provision is intended to en-
courage the use of statistical sampling techniques whenever it would be 
appropriate to do so. For example, the Nevada statute provides: 
Proof of such damages must be based on: 
(1) Statistical or sampling methods; 
(2) The pro rata allocation of illegal overcharges of sales occurring 
within the State of Nevada; or 
(3) Such other reasonable system of estimating aggregate damages 
as the court may permit. 108 
103. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1 cmt. n.3 (2005). 
104. See Connor & Lande, supra note 102, at 559. 
105. ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 182 (citing Ren v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-004035-CZ, 
2002 WL 1839983, at *17 (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 11,2(02» ("In Ren v. Philip Morris, Inc., for exam-
ple, a proposed class of smokers in Michigan sought to recover the allegedly inflated cost of cigarettes 
due to price-fixing on the part of cigarette manufacturers. Although the plaintiffs convinced the court 
that their expert had a valid methodology, backed up by empirical analysis, to establish impact on a 
class-wide basis, their class certification motion foundered on their inability to prove the amount of 
damages to individual smokers .... [T]he plaintiffs could do no more on a class-wide basis than prove 
the amount of damages in the aggregate. "). See also Piggly Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Interstate 
Brands Corp., 100 Fed. Appx. 296, 297 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The necessity of calculating damages on an 
individual basis, by itself, can be grounds for not certifying a class. "). 
106. See ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 182 (This is one way to interpret Ren v. Philip Morris.). 
See also A & M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 654 N.W.2d 572 (Mich. Ct. App. 2(02). 
107. See ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 181-93. 
108. NEV. REv. STAT. § 598A.160 (1999). 
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The Clayton Act, Section 4D, contains a variation of this approach, but it 
only applies to state attorney general parens patriae actions against price 
fixing: 
In any action under section 15c(a)(1) of this title, in which there 
has been a determination that a defendant agreed to fix prices in 
violation of sections 1 to 7 of this title, damages may be proved 
and assessed in the aggregate by statistical or sampling methods, 
by the computation of illegal overcharges, or by such other rea-
sonable system of estimating aggregate damages as the court in its 
discretion may permit without the necessity of separately proving 
the individual claim of, or amount of damage to, persons on 
whose behalf the suit was brought. 109 
Thus, this type of provision would not be unprecedented. 
C. Direct/Indirect Purchaser Damages Allocation Provisions 
Options allocating damages between direct and indirect purchasers are 
designed to enable indirect purchasers to sue for damages, while ensuring 
that the direct and indirect purchaser claims, together, total only treble 
damages. With caveats that will be analyzed at the end of the first Subsec-
tion, these options are not designed to increase the total amount of expo-
sure that defendants face, overall compensation for all consumers, or de-
terrence. Their primary rationale is the belief that if a state permitted 
treble damage recoveries by both direct and by indirect purchasers, this 
would constitute a duplicative recovery, overcompensation to direct pur-
chaser "victims" who were not harmed very much or at all by the viola-
tion, overdeterrence, or both.lIO This is similar to the concern of some 
who believe that separate recovery under both federal and state law also 
would be excessive. 111 
The following approaches address the allocation of damages between 
direct and indirect purchasers. From a fairness or compensation perspec-
tive, allocating damages is desirable because, without an IBR, the ultimate 
victims of antitrust violations often are unable to recover for their injuries. 
Their underlying rationale was eloquently suggested by Professor Areeda: 
The obvious difficulty with denying damages to consumers when 
buying from an intermediary is that they are injured, often more 
109. 15 U.S.c. § 15d (2000). 
llO. See, e.g., Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (allowing a 
Hanover Shoe defense in a suit under the California indirect purchaser law). 
llI. See Page, supra note IS. 
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than the intermediary, who may also be injured, but for whom the 
entire overcharge is a windfall. The indirect purchaser rule greatly 
overcompensates intermediaries and greatly undercompensates 
consumers in the name of efficiency in the administration of the 
antitrust laws. 112 
1. Hanover Shoe Repealers 
A straightforward way to implement this type of concern and make it 
unlikely that the direct purchasers are overrewarded is in the Washington, 
D.C. statute: 
In actions where both direct and indirect purchasers are involved, 
a defendant shall be entitled to prove as a partial or complete de-
fense to a claim for damages that the illegal overcharge has been 
passed on to others who are themselves entitled to recover so as to 
avoid duplication of recovery of damages. 113 
Similarly, the Rhode Island law provides: 
In any action under this section the fact that a person or public 
body has not dealt directly with the defendant shall not bar or oth-
erwise limit recovery. Provided, however, that the court shall ex-
clude from the amount of monetary relief awarded in the action 
any amount of monetary relief which duplicates amounts which 
have been awarded for the same injury. 114 
This type of provision would permit a passing-on defense in damage ac-
tions, so it would in effect reject Hanover Shoe115 considerations. 
Although it addresses the allocation of damages between direct and in-
direct purchasers, this type of proposal could alter the total damages paid 
in certain situations. For example, the direct purchasers might choose not 
to sue because they were too intimidated by their need to have future deal-
ings with the violator(s), or because they passed most or all their over-
112. 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & RODGER D. BLAIR, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 
2000). Prof. Hovenkamp similarly concludes: 
For direct purchasing intermediaries who pass the monopolized product on down the distri-
bution chain the overcharge is not even a rough approximation of the i~ury they sustain. 
Rather, their injury comes mainly from lost volume. Indeed, the indirect purchaser rule of-
ten assigns the full damage action to actors who are not injured by the monopoly price at 
all, or who would simply be unable to prove any injury if relegated to traditional principles 
of damages measurement. 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Dominant Firm: Where Do We Stand?, at 7 (unpublished draft. 
on file at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/section2hearings/hovenkamppaper.pdt). 
113. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4509(b) (LexisNexis 2006). 
114. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g) (2006). 
115. Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
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charges to the next level. Under these circumstances this provision would 
permit indirect purchasers to recover, so the total damages paid by defen-
dants would increase. 
Alternatively, total damages typically paid by defendants, and the total 
amount of deterrence against future anticompetitive behavior, could at 
times diminish under this type of mR. When both direct and indirect pur-
chasers are deciding whether to sue, the uncertainty over whether any re-
covery obtained would go to the direct purchasers, to the first level of 
indirect purchaser, to a subsequent indirect purchaser, or to two or more 
levels in the distribution chain in some unpredictable ratio, could cause 
each class of purchasers to decline to me suit. Both direct and indirect 
purchasers might be less likely to invest the considerable amount of time 
and money needed in light of the very real prospect that the court could 
award some or even all of the fruits of their efforts to the other class( es) of 
purchasers. Any mR likely to cause contentious litigation between various 
classes of purchasers inadvertently could discourage private actions, shield 
violators, and ensure that no aggrieved party received any compensation. 
Ironically, a statute like that proposed recently by the ABA which pro-
vides, in effect, "never mind at the outset which class of plaintiff gets the 
money, the court can straighten that out after it determines liability and 
damages, "116 could lead to fewer lawsuits and therefore less compensation 
and deterrence. The ensuing fight over the damages allocation also would 
constitute wasteful and potentially lengthy litigation, further diminishing 
and delaying the amounts that will be awarded to each class of victim. 
The following options are intended to help prevent this problem (and 
accomplish other tasks as well) by making a presumption or conclusive 
fmding as to which layer in the distribution chain absorbed the over-
charge. 
2. Include a rebuttable presumption that all of the damages accrue to 
the final purchasers. 
For example, the Feb. 2004 ABA Discussion Draft contains the fol-
lowing: 
It shall be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that 
the total illegal overcharge incurred by a direct purchaser was 
passed on to the ultimate purchaser, who made such purchase not 
for resale and in a form that has not been substantially modified at 
the time of such purchase; otherwise a defendant shall be entitled 
to prove as a partial or complete defense to a claim for damages 
that the illegal overcharge has been passed on to others who are 
116. See ABA Discussion Draft, supra note 50. 
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themselves entitled to recover so as to avoid duplication of recov-
ery of damages. 1I7 
The European Union has proposed a presumption that the entire over-
charge was passed through to end users.I1S A relatively simple law doing 
this could be worded as follows: 
It shall be presumed that the ultimate purchasers (who bought not 
for resale) incurred, absorbed, and ultimately paid all of the dam-
ages caused by the antitrust violation. All other purchasers in the 
chain of distribution can, however, attempt to rebut this presump-
tion and prove that they absorbed part or all of these damages. 
The presumption that ultimate consumers pay all the damages would be 
desirable from a compensation perspective because [mal purchasers often 
are the real payers of the majority of the overcharges. It also should re-
duce uncertainty over which class will receive the damages, and this 
should encourage the victims to sue. Its disadvantage, of course, is that 
injured direct purchasers would be less likely to receive any recovery, and 
this could be undesirable because the direct victims are sometimes harmed 
and because they often have the strongest incentive to file suit. Moreover, 
there could be significant litigation over whether this presumption should 
be overcome. Since such litigation can be both wasteful and lengthy and 
could undermine both levels' incentives to sue, it has obvious disadvantag-
es, and for this reason there would be an advantage to making the pre-
sumptive conclusive. 
3. Award Damages to Direct Purchasers and to Indirect Purchasers in 
a Predetermined Manner. 
Potential fights between direct and indirect purchasers could be mini-
mized if the awarded damages were split in a way that presumptively 
awarded a fixed percentage of total (trebled) damages both to direct pur-
chasers, and also to indirect purchasers. This predetermined split is justi-
fied from a fairness or compensation perspective because it seems likely 
that in many or most cases both direct and indirect purchasers absorbed 
some of the overcharges. The predetermined split approach also is appro-
priate from a deterrence perspective because it should give each class of 
purchaser at least some incentive to sue, probably more than an approach 
that awarded them an uncertain percentage. Moreover, sometimes the di-
117. Id. 
118. Comm'n of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages for Breach of the EC Anti-
trust Rules, Section 2.6 at 7-8 (Feb. 4, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/commlcompetition 
/antitrustlactionsdam ages/files_white jJaper/whitepaper _ en. pdf. 
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rect purchasers will have more of an incentive to sue,119 while other times 
the indirect purchasers have the greater incentive. 120 This type of provision 
ensures that the better situated plaintiff always will have an incentive to 
litigate. 121 It would also minimize litigation time and costs. 
For example, a statute could contain a rebuttable presumption that di-
rect purchasers paid at least a third of the damages and that indirect pur-
chasers also paid at least a third of the damages. When trebled, this would 
mean that direct and indirect purchasers each would receive at least single 
damages: 122 
It shall be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that 
the direct purchasers incurred at least one third of the damages, 
and for this reason the direct purchasers shall recover at least one 
third of the awarded damages. It also shall be presumed, in the ab-
sence of proof to the contrary, that the indirect purchasers in-
curred at least one third of the damages, and for this reason the 
indirect purchasers shall recover at least one third of the awarded 
damages. The final third of the damages shall be awarded by the 
Court to those purchasers most likely to have absorbed the damag-
es. All computed damage amounts shall be trebled before they are 
awarded. 
This proposal is worded in terms of damages rather than overcharges be-
cause some cases might involve monopsony. Another option is to split the 
damages 50150: 
It shall be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that 
the direct purchasers incurred one half of the damages, and for 
this reason the direct purchasers shall recover one half of the 
awarded damages. It also shall be presumed, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, that the indirect purchasers incurred one half 
of the damages, and for this reason the indirect purchasers shall 
recover one half of the awarded damages. The damage amounts 
119. See infra notes 321-37 and accompanying text. 
120. [d. 
121. These cases usually are brought on a contingent fee basis, involving considerable risk, ex-
penses, attorney time, and years of delay before any recovery. See generally Lande & Davis, supra 
note 11. The only way to safeguard victims is to be cognizant of the position of their would-be law-
yers, who are unlikely to file suit unless they can predict, in advance of the litigation, that the class 
they represent stands a reasonable likelihood of a significant recovery. There can, of course, never be 
a way to guarantee any recovery to victims or compensation to their would-be attorneys since many 
cases are unsuccessful and many plaintiffs' attorneys do not deserve compensation. Nevertheless, a 
presumptive or guaranteed split of the recovery between different classes of victims could help to 
provide the necessary incentives for the victims and their attorneys. 
122. A jurisdiction especially interested in making sure that injured parties were compensated could 
add a prejudgment interest provision. See infra Part Ill.D (provision I). 
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shall be calculated as being equal to three times the amount by 
which the violators illegally raised or lowered prices to the first 
purchaser. 
Another variation would award 1/3 of the damages to the direct purchasers 
and 2/3 to the indirect purchasers. 
4. Provide for a conclusive, rather than presumptive, allocation of 
damages. 
Conclusively allocating damages would avoid a great deal of potential-
ly contentious, lengthy, and costly litigation. It would also allow direct 
and indirect purchasers to focus their efforts against the law violator, ra-
ther than against each other. Without a guarantee-not merely a presump-
tion-that each class of purchaser will receive at least some of the recov-
ery, neither direct nor indirect purchasers may have sufficient incentive to 
undertake the significant investment of time and money required to pursue 
a lawsuit. 123 This approach would be efficient and highly desirable from a 
deterrence perspective: both direct and indirect purchasers would have a 
strong incentive to sue. One drawback to this approach is that it could lead 
to some purchasers being overrewarded while other purchasers were un-
derrewarded: 
It conclusively shall be found that the direct purchasers absorbed 
one-half of the damages, and for this reason the direct purchasers 
shall recover one half of the awarded damages. It also shall con-
clusively be presumed that the indirect purchasers absorbed half of 
the damages, and for this reason the indirect purchasers shall re-
cover half of the awarded damages. All computed damage 
amounts shall be trebled before they are awarded. 
A variation would be to split the damages in a 113 to 2/3 ratio. Anoth-
er alternative would award both direct and indirect purchasers single dam-
ages, and allow the court to determine which purchasers are most entitled 
to the remaining single damages: 
It conclusively shall be found that the direct purchasers incurred 
at least one third of the damages, and for this reason the direct 
purchasers shall recover at least one third of the awarded damag-
123. In general, class certification might be harder for indirect purchasers because of remoteness 
issues. If true, this is another reason why indirect purchasers should be given an incentive to sue 
through the assurance of a recovery of part of the treble damages. Some believe, however, that when 
the litigation is over a product (like a prescription drug) that does not change form through the chain 
of distribution, it should be no more difficult to get a class certified than a direct purchaser case. 
Similar arguments apply to the damages phases of direct and indirect purchaser actions. 
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es. It also conclusively shall be found that the indirect purchasers 
incurred at least one third of the damages, and for this reason the 
indirect purchasers shall recover at least one third of the awarded 
damages. The fmal third of the damages shall be awarded by the 
Court to those purchasers most likely to have absorbed the damag-
es. All computed damage amounts shall be trebled before they are 
awarded. 
481 
A significant complication arises from the fact that there often will be 
more than one level of indirect purchasers that could make an arguable 
claim to have absorbed some or all of the overcharges. 124 Not only is it 
often extremely difficult to allocate the ultimate absorption of overcharges 
between direct and indirect purchasers; it also is likely to be difficult to 
allocate the ultimate payment of these overcharges between different levels 
of indirect purchasers. The necessary litigation to determine which level 
paid exactly how much of the overcharges could discourage the filing of 
these actions, which could lead to less deterrence. Moreover, the expenses 
involved in this litigation could diminish the total amount of compensation 
likely to be received by aggrieved consumers. One solution to these prob-
lems, when there is more than one level of indirect purchasers, would be 
to award each level single damages. A statute doing so could be worded as 
follows: 
In cases where there is only one level of indirect victims (Le., 
where the ultimate consumers of the products or services in ques-
tion deal directly with the firms that dealt with the antitrust viola-
tors), it shall be conclusively presumed that the direct and the indi-
rect victims each absorbed half of the damages. In these cases the 
direct victims shall recover half of the awarded damages, and the 
indirect victims also shall recover half of the awarded damages. 
The damage amounts shall be calculated as three times the amount 
by which the violators illegally raised or lowered prices to the first 
purchaser. 
In cases involving more than one level of indirect victims, the total 
damages caused by the violator's or violators' direct overcharges 
124. This complication was stressed by Bennett Rushkoff, Chief, Consumer and Trade Protection 
Section, Office of the Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia at a March 25, 2004 program on 
antitrust damages sponsored by the D.C. Bar Association's Antitrust, Trade Regulation, and Consum-
er Affairs Section. 
Rushkoff also pointed out that an approach which awarded each level of purchaser some 
damages would have the advantage of ensuring continued general support for the antitrust laws from 
direct purchasers, an important class of businesses. He noted that frequently many or most indirect 
purchasers are consumers, and without some kind of damages redress possibility for direct purchasers 
the political support for antitrust from an important sector of the business community could decrease. 
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or undercharges shall be computed. This will be the amount by 
which the violators illegally raised or lowered prices to the first 
purchaser. This amount will be awarded to the direct purchasers 
and also to each level of indirect purchasers. These amounts shall 
not, however, be trebled. 
If one's highest priority is optimal deterrence, this alternative has merit 
because it would give each level of purchaser in the chain of distribution 
some damages, and therefore some incentive to sue. If one's highest prior-
ity is optimal compensation, however, the ultimate buyer at the bottom of 
the distribution chain should receive the bulk of the claim because they are 
the only level without the ability to pass on an overcharge. 
Under this alternative each level of purchaser would have an incentive 
to detect and sue the cartel because each class would be guaranteed some 
of the recovery. By contrast, without a conclusive presumption, there is a 
possibility that no class will sue out of fear that the award would go to 
another class of victim. Another advantage of a conclusive presumption is 
that litigation costs would be minimized because the different victim 
classes would not litigate against one another over who really paid how 
much of the damages. 125 
This approach would mean that on occasion the total amount of dam-
ages awarded could total more than threefold. Depending upon the number 
of levels of indirect purchasers in the relevant market, damages could total 
fourfold or more. Such a proposal might be thought of as a compromise 
between the preferences of those who believe that total damages should 
never exceed traditional antitrust treble damages, and those who believe 
that the nominal "treble damages" awarded under the antitrust laws today 
actually constitute only single damages. 126 This later group believes that, 
from the perspective of optimal deterrence, and in light of the omission of 
prejudgment interest and the other adjustments that should be made to the 
current so-called "treble damages" awarded under the antitrust laws, 127 
this type of approach would ensure that the total awarded damages level 
would be closer to true treble damages. 
A downside of this approach is that awarding each level of purchasers 
single damages, regardless of whether, or the extent to which, the pur-
chasers were actually harmed, some purchasers would be overcompen-
sated while others would be undercompensated. Another downside would 
be that the size of the defendants' payments will depend upon the number 
of classes of indirect purchasers that buy their product or service. This 
125. This approach also might alleviate some notice problems. A conclusive allocation of damages 
among different classes of purchasers could make disputes over who gets notice less of an issue. 
126. See Lande, Single Damages?, supra note 27, passim. 
127. [d. 
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surely will strike many as odd or unfair: some defendants would pay treble 
damages, but others would pay fourfold or fivefold damages, depending 
only upon whether the product or service in question were sold to one, 
two, or three levels of indirect purchasers. The number of levels of pur-
chasers should not be an issue from a deterrence or fairness perspective. 
An alternative that eliminates this problem would be to presume or 
conclusively fmd that every level in the distribution chain was harmed 
equally, and then to split the trebled damages among the various levels in 
the distribution chain: 
The total damages caused by the violator's or violators' direct 
overcharges or undercharges shall be computed. The awarded 
damage amounts shall be calculated as three times the amount by 
which the violators illegally raised or lowered prices to the first 
purchaser. This result will be split equally among each level of di-
rect or indirect purchaser, so that each level receives an equal 
amount. 
Another alternative would award single damages to the direct purchas-
ers, single damages to the fmallevel of indirect purchasers, and direct the 
court to award the final single damages to whichever level or levels are 
most entitled to this relief: 
The total damages caused by the violator's or violators' direct 
overcharges or undercharges shall be computed. The total awarded 
damage amounts shall be calculated as equal to three times the 
amount by which the violators illegally raised or . lowered prices to 
the first purchaser. It shall be conclusively presumed that the di-
rect victims and the fmal level of indirect victims are each entitled 
to single damages. 
In cases involving only one level of indirect purchasers, the indi-
rect purchasers will receive a second award of single damages. 
In cases involving more than one level of indirect purchasers, the 
Court shall make another single damages award to either the direct 
purchasers, the fmal level of indirect purchasers, or to any other 
level of indirect purchasers, in whatever ratio the Court believes is 
appropriate. These amounts shall correspond to the Court's deter-
mination as to which level of purchaser absorbed the damages 
from the violation. 
5. Have the court designate a "presumptive lead plaintiff." 
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Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray propose handling the al-
location of damages between direct and indirect purchasers by having the 
court designate a "presumptive lead plaintiff," a solution modeled after the 
approach often used in securities litigation.!28 They propose: 
Following the initiation of an antitrust suit and after appropriate 
notice is given, other parties claiming injury may join, after which 
the action becomes closed. At this point, the court ... will desig-
nate a lead plaintiff. The court's designation would be directed by 
two guiding principles; first, a presumption in favor of the party 
who initiated the suit, and second, a presumption in favor of the 
party claiming the greatest damages.!29 
They explain that the first factor is designed to "enhance the incentives for 
potential plaintiffs to bring suit" and the second presumption "is designed 
to identify the party best capable of handling the litigation and representing 
the preferences of the joined plaintiffs. ,,130 Despite these advantages, this 
approach has significant drawbacks. First, the plaintiff claiming the most 
damages would not necessarily be the plaintiff that actually was harmed 
the most. Nor would the party first filing suit be likely to have been 
harmed the most.!3! Also, given the complexities involved in the pass-
through calculations, it is not likely to be readily or quickly apparent 
which class of purchasers actually absorbed most of the overcharges. This 
can only be determined after a lengthy investigation. Finally, whichever 
class of plaintiff is designated "lead plaintiff' would have an incentive to 
be unfair to the other classes of plaintiffs. For all these reasons the di-
rect/indirect purchaser situation is likely to be different from that involv-
ing securities cases. 
128. Richman & Murray, supra note 31. 
129. [d. at 106-07 (footnotes omitted). 
130. [d. at 107. 
131. Direct purchasers would be likely to be the first ones to notice an illegal price rise, but this 
would not mean they were the ones ultimately" to absorb most of the price rise. 
An analogous "race to the courthouse" alternative was promulgated by Prof. Dennis Carlton, 
while he was an AMC Commissioner. Prof. Carlton suggests permitting suits by direct purchasers 
only, and allowing indirect purchasers to file only if no direct purchaser filed within a specified period 
of time. In these cases there could only be indirect purchaser suits. See AMC report, supra note 51. 
While attractive in many respects, this approach also has significant drawbacks. It assumes, 
without evidence, that direct purchasers have the greatest incentive to sue. It also would give direct 
purchasers an incentive to file quickly even if they have no incentive to pursue the litigation seriously. 
If the direct purchasers were not the class harmed significantly and fear retaliation from powerful 
suppliers, they would have an incentive to settle on easy terms. This would ingratiate them to the 
supplier-violators, but result in both inadequate overall deterrence and inadequate compensation for the 
true victims. 
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D. Additional Provisions 
There are a number of additional provisions that a state might want to 
include in IBR legislation. These provisions could be important regardless 
of whether the indirect purchasers were simply given an additional right to 
sue for damages, or whether the damages awarded to indirect purchasers 
would be subtracted from the damages awarded to direct purchasers. 
These provisions, moreover, could also be included in direct purchaser 
statutes, especially where the state was especially interested in having an 
antitrust law that provides strong deterrence against anticompetitive con-
duct and in fully compensating victims. 
1. Award prejudgment interest. 
Prejudgment interest is not awarded under the federal antitrust statutes 
and, as a practical matter, 132 is only theoretically available under a few 
state statutes.133 This omission could, however, be cured by a statute pro-
viding that: 
Damages for injuries by reason of anything forbidden in this Act 
shall include interest thereon computed from the date on which 
such injury is sustained, at a rate that will provide the present val-
ue of such damages, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable at-
torney's fee. 
The award of prejudgment interest, even if made in addition to treble 
damages, would not be a "duplicative" form of recovery. It is simply a 
way to account for inflation and the time value of money, and it is neces-
sary to make victims whole. Prejudgment interest also should help to fos-
ter optimal deterrence; if a lawbreaker steals $1.00 and is only forced to 
give back $1.00 eight years later,134 it will have made a tidy profit from 
the transaction. 135 For this reason many believe that a prejudgment interest 
provision is nonduplicative, fair, and reasonable. 
132. Most courts currently can award prejudgment interest in situations involving defendants' bad 
faith or as a sanction for dilatory behavior, but this apparently never has happened in an antitrust case. 
For example, Section 16750 of California'S damages law provides that a plaintiff shall "recover three 
times the damages sustained by him or her, interest on his or her actual damages pursuant to Section 
16761 .... " CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 2(08). However, Section 16761 provides that 
this will only happen when "the court finds that the award of interest for such period is just in the 
circumstances." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16761 (West 2(08). The appropriate circumstances 
include the filing of meritless motions, assertions, or defenses. [d. 
133. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a) (Vernon 2(05). 
134. The average of the estimates made by several prominent scholars suggests that the average 
cartel case lasts between seven and eight years. See discussion in Lande, Single Damages?, supra note 
27, at 130-34. 
135. For example, $100.00 in 2000 would have the same buying power as $125.03 in 2008. See 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
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One could argue that damage awards are trebled in part to account for 
the lack of prejudgment interest. It seems much more likely, 136 however, 
that the trebling actually is performed to account for the difficulty of de-
tecting and proving violations. Under the standard optimal deterrence 
model, if only one-third of cartels are detected, convicted, and made to 
pay damages, then damages should be trebled to insure that collusion is 
not profitable. 137 Including prejudgment interest would make awards re-
flect the present value of the harms inflicted. Antitrust damages could then 
truly act as a more effective deterrent against anticompetitive behavior. 138 
While the logic underlying prejudgment interest applies equally to direct 
purchaser recoveries, a prejudgment interest provision might be of special 
interest to jurisdictions contemplating a statute that only awards single 
damages to indirect purchasers. A much more limited approach would 
limit prejudgment interest to suits brought by state attorneys general. 
As an alternative to explicitly adding a prejudgment provision, an IBR 
instead could allow purchasers to recover for the diminished value of their 
business. This could be similar to a prejudgment interest provision: 
A claimant may, at its election, use the diminished value of its 
business or property caused by the antitrust violation, instead of 
the amount of overcharges or undercharges paid, as the proper 
measure of damages. This diminution in value shall be computed 
as the difference between the value of the victim's business or 
property at the time of the violation, and the value of the victim's 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2010). One way to avoid litigation over the proper prejudgment interest rate would 
be for the law instead to set the prejudgment interest rate as the same interest rate as that provided by 
statute for post judgment interest. 
136. Inflation rates were relatively low when the Clayton Act was passed. See Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Consumer Price Index, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Feb. 
9, 2010). Moreover, litigation was not as lengthy. See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Anti-
trust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 374-81 (1970). Thus, accounting for prejudgment interest 
seems very unlikely to have been a significant concern. 
137. For the standard optimal deterrence framework, see William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions 
For Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 652, 656 (1983). 
The multiplier used in calculating antitrust damages should be larger than one because not 
all violations are detected and proven. From the perspective of optimal deterrence, if dam-
ages and fines only total actual damages, firms would be undeterred from committing viola-
tions. For this reason most agree that there should be some kind of multiplier. If we only 
catch and successfully prosecute 113 of all cartels, for example, then threefold damages are 
appropriate to achieve optimal deterrence. Of course, no one knows whether we catch more 
or less than 113 of all antitrust violations. But, since a multiplier of more than 1 is appro-
priate, and no one can demonstrate that antitrust should instead use a multiplier of 2 or 4, 
we nsually assume, without much evidence, that only 113 of all cartels are detected and 
proven, and therefore, a multiplier of 3 is appropriate. Optimal damages therefore are as-
sumed to be equal to the net harm to others times 3. 
Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels, supra note 7, at 335-37 (citations omitted). 
138. Without prejudgment interest the "treble" damages multiplier would be closer to double dam-
ages. See Lande, Single Damages?, supra note 27, at 134-36. 
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business or property at the time of the damages judgment, insofar 
as this difference was caused by the antitrust violation. 
Since the value of a business normally will increase simply due to infla-
tion, this type of provision could be an implicit way to effectively bring a 
rough form of prejudgment interest into the pretrebling base. It might face 
less opposition than an explicit prejudgment interest provision. This type 
of damages sometimes is awarded currently, but this provision should 
make its award more common. 139 It would not, however, benefit consumer 
victims. 
2. Increase the statute of limitations to Eight years. 
The current federal statute of limitations for antitrust damages actions 
is four years,140 and state statutes of limitations differ. There is evidence, 
however, that the average cartel lasts for roughly seven to eight years.141 
Sometimes the illegal overcharges that arise during the early years of a 
cartel's activity can be recovered through one of the exceptions to the sta-
tute of limitations. 142 Nevertheless, sometimes a relatively short statute of 
limitations will immunize early cartel activity. A state might want to make 
its IBR's statute of limitations as least as long as the length of the average 
cartel. 
3. Encourage recovery of the "umbrella effects" 143 of market power. 
A cartel or monopoly cannot effectively earn supracompetitive profits 
unless prices rise for substantially the entire affected market. l44 If a cartel 
or monopoly with significantly less than a 100 % market share raises pric-
es, it would be difficult for these prices to stay elevated very long unless 
most of the nonviolating firms in the market implicitly went along with the 
price increase, at least to some extent. 145 If noncolluding firms reacted 
independently to the changed price levels, their conduct would be legal. 
139. See generally ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES DAMAGES 
INSTRUCTION No.2, at F-12 (200S). 
140. IS U.S.C. § ISb (200S). 
141. See Lande, Single Damages?, supra note 27, at 130-34. 
142. The most common is the fraudulent concealment exception. ld. at 136-38. 
143. This is the name commonly given for price rises of products sold by nonviolating firms when 
these price rises are caused by the illegal activity. For example, OPEC never produced even 70% of 
the free world's supply of oil. Yet, when OPEC raised prices, prices also increased for the oil sold by 
noncartel members. See Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 
6S1, 6S4 (2006) [hereinafter Lande, Five Mythsl, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers 
.cfrn?abstracUd = 1263478. Moreover, the price of fuels that were partial substitutes for oil, such as 
natural gas, also rose. ld. Any price rises that took place outside the affected relevant market, howev-
er, would probably be too complicated to assess, so they will not be analyzed further in this Article. 
144. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 12002f6 (vol. 2, 2d ed. 200S). 
14S. This also could occur if the cartel is able to price-discriminate effectively. For an explanation 
and analysis of the welfare effects of price discrimination, see Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 42. 
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Nevertheless, these elevated prices are not serendipitous: they are neces-
sary for the violators' cartel to function effectively. The violators can only 
earn supracompetitive profits if the other prices in the market also rise. 
These "umbrella effects" of market power are another harm caused by 
the anticompetitive activity. This provision would make the law violators, 
and only the law violators, responsible for umbrella damages. The firms 
that did not engage in the illegal behavior would not have to pay damages 
due to the elevated prices on the products they sold. 
Many respected scholars, including Professors Areeda and Hoven-
kamp, have concluded that antitrust violations should be considered the 
direct cause of their umbrella effects and that injured plaintiffs should be 
able to collect for these overcharges from the violators. 146 Yet, the umbrel-
la effects of market power are unusually difficult to prove, and defendants 
can assert that they are remote, speCUlative, incidental, or indirect. Be-
cause of these proof problems, umbrella effects rarely, if ever, are 
awarded in antitrust cases. 147 Courts are split over whether plaintiffs 
should even have standing to attempt to prove their existence. 148 A statute 
that encourages their award could be worded as follows: 
When a firm or firms that violate any of the antitrust laws engage 
in illegal activity that affects prices, there is a presumption that the 
illegal behavior caused prices to change for all sales in the affected 
relevant market, including the sales of nonviolating firms that are 
in this market. The changed prices of nonviolating firms shall be 
considered the direct, proximate, and nonspeculative result of the 
violator(s) activities and shall be attributed to the activities of the 
violator(s). The violators shall pay these damages to the violation's 
victims. 
A presumption that umbrella effects of market power exist and should be 
proximately attributed to the violators' actions would simplify proof prob-
lems and lead to greater deterrence. To avoid litigation, the "presumption" 
could instead be "conclusive." A more limited approach would limit the 
use of the presumption or conclusion to suits brought by state attorneys 
general. 
4. Provide that plaintiffs (or, alternatively, only the state attorney gen-
eral) can recover for the allocative inefficiency harms of illegally acquired 
or maintained market power. 
146. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTiTRUST LAw 1337.3 (Supp. 1992). 
147. The author is not aware of any final antitrust verdict awarding umbrella effects. 
148. Id. 
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"Allocative inefficiency" is the economic term that describes the gen-
eral harm to the welfare or efficiency of the economy caused by the reduc-
tion in output that accompanies the exercise of market power. 149 It 
represents the lost "consumers' surplus" or total worth of goods and ser-
vices in a society that would have arisen but for the supracompetitive pric-
ing. Allocative inefficiency harms in no respects duplicate or overlap with 
the wealth transfer effects of antitrust violations. 150 Moreover, most lead-
ing conservative scholars, such as Judge Frank Easterbrook, lSI believe that 
allocative inefficiency is another harm from market power that, in addition 
to the wealth transfer effects, should be included in antitrust awards. 152 
A major problem with even considering the inclusion of allocative in-
efficiency harms in an antitrust award, however, is that it is an amorphous 
and difficult-to-understand concept that sounds like it could be only theo-
retical. 153 It is difficult even to fmd an intuitive, nontechnical way to de-
scribe it, although at least one court seemed to understand the term. 154 
Nevertheless, it might be significant that the current Nevada statute pro-
vides that, in addition to normal antitrust damages, the Nevada Attorney 
General is empowered to sue "[a]s parens patriae, with respect to direct or 
indirect damages to the general economy of the State of Nevada or any 
political subdivision thereof. "ISS Are the "direct or indirect damages to the 
general economy" of the state the same as the "allocative inefficiency" 
effects of market power? The term used in the Nevada statute could be a 
nontechnical way of describing the concept of allocative inefficiency. We 
are, however, unaware of any court interpretations directly on point. 156 
149. A more detailed explanation of the concept of allocative inefficiency is complex. See Lande, 
Single Damages?, supra note 27, at 119-22, 152-53; Frank Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 454-55. 
150. The wealth transfer effects of market power consist only of the money transferred from the 
victims to the violators due to the illegally acquired market power, not of the economic inefficiency it 
creates. See Lande, Single Damages?, supra note 27, at 152-53. 
151. See Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 454-55. 
152. [d. See also Landes, supra note 137. 
153. It is, however, routinely taught in first or second year economics courses, and also in standard 
antitrust law classes. See, e.g., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 7-17 (LexisNexis 5th ed. 2003). 
154. See Island Tobacco v. R. J. Reynolds Indus., 513 F. Supp. 726, 740 n.22 (D. Haw. 1981) 
("Where independent firms agree to fix prices, they reduce the number of economic units with market 
price discretion. Allocative inefficiency occurs where, for example, open market discretion is elimi-
nated and firms agree to fix prices above the marginal cost of production, which is the level toward 
which prices tend to move if many firms within the market freely compete with each other. H). 
155. NEV. REv. STAT. § 598A.I60(I)(b) (2005). 
156. However, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1972) held that a state may not 
recover for harm to its general economy, although the concept of allocative inefficiency was never 
explicitly discussed in this opinion: 
Thus, § 4 permits Hawaii to sue in its proprietary capacity for three times the damages it 
has suffered from respondents' alleged antitrust violations. The section gives the same right 
to every citizen of Hawaii with respect to any damage to business or property. Were we, in 
addition, to hold that Congress authorized the State to recover damages for injury to its 
general economy, we would open the door to duplicative recoveries. 
This court gave the reason why this recovery could not be permitted under the antitrust laws: 
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Another drawback to including this damages item is that it is difficult 
to trace exactly who suffers this effect because allocative inefficiency 
harms such a diverse group within the economy. 157 Perhaps due to these 
proof problems, apparently no plaintiff has ever recovered for the alloca-
tive inefficiency harms of market power. 158 In light of the immense prob-
lems in identifying precisely who is harmed by allocative inefficiency, 
perhaps only state attorneys general should even be allowed to attempt to 
recover for the allocative inefficiency harms of market power, in parens 
patriae suits. They would, after all, represent the consumers of their states 
in such actions, so a recovery for the allocative inefficiency harms of mar-
ket power in these situations would be appropriate. 
As a practical matter, it would be extremely difficult for any plaintiff, 
even a state attorney general, to prove the size of the allocative inefficien-
cy harms since this would require calculating the shape of the demand 
curve for the product or service in question. 159 It therefore would be cru-
cial to have a statutory conclusion (or at least a presumption) as to its size. 
The resolution of this issue was suggested by Judge Easterbrook, who 
wrote that in general the allocative inefficiency harms of market power are 
equal to 50% of its wealth transfer effects. l60 A more conservative ap-
"Measurement of an injury to the general economy, on the other hand, necessarily involves an exami-
nation of the impact of a restraint of trade upon every variable that affects the State's economic 
healthDa task extremely difficult, 'in the real economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical 
model.'" [d. at 263 n.14 (citation omitted). 
157. For example, suppose a cartel raised the price of a product from $1.00 to $1.50. A consumer 
who would have purchased the product for $1.25 was harmed by $0.25 due to the cartel's actions. But 
it would be extraordinarily difficult for this consumer to prove that they gladly would have purchased 
it if the product had been priced at $1.00, and would reluctantly have purchased it at $1.25, but did 
not purchase it (or purchased a smaller quantity) because the cartel raised the price to $1.50. 
158. The author is not aware of any final antitrust verdict awarding any sum for the allocative 
inefficiency effects of market power. 
159. See Easterbrook, supra note 39. 
160. Judge Frank Easterbrook explained why he believes that the allocative inefficiency effects of 
market power are 50% as large as the wealth transfer effects: 
In the simple case of linear demand and supply curves, the allocative loss is half the mono-
poly overcharge, so a multiplier of 1.5 is in order. These curves doubtless are not linear, 
but legal rules must be derived from empirical guesses rather than exhaustive investigation. 
The multiplier of 1.5 thus may be a rough approximation of the lower bound. It takes care 
of the fact that the nonbuyers do not recover damages. A further multiplier is necessary to 
handle the improbability of proving liability. As uncertainty and the difficulty of prosecu-
tion increase, so should the multiplier. From the violator's perspective, "treble" damages 
really are double the starting point of overcharge plus allocative loss, and thus trebling the 
overcharge is appropriate when the chance of finding and successfully prosecuting a viola-
tion is one in two. 
[d. at 454-55. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission might have estimated that the allocative inefficiency effects 
of market power are as large as the transfer effects, although the evidence for this is ambiguous. It 
wrote: 
It is estimated that the average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the selling price. The 
loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain because, among other things, injury is inflicted upon 
consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the higher prices. 
Because the loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain, subsection (d)(I) provides that 20 per-
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proach would be to presume that the allocative inefficiency harms are only 
one-third of the transfer effects. If we assume the allocative inefficiency 
effects of market power are one-third as large as the transfer effects, when 
these two figures are added (to 1.33 times the overcharge) and then 
trebled, the result would total four times the original damages. This same 
presumption would be equally appropriate in both direct and indirect pur-
chaser actions. This could be accomplished by a provision such as the fol-
lowing: 
When states sue in their capacity as parens patriae they shall also 
recover for the general harm to the welfare [efficiency] of the 
economy caused by [the reduction in output] caused by the anti-
trust violation. This damage will be [presumed to equal] [conclu-
sively found to equal] one third of the overcharges caused by the 
antitrust violation. This amount will be trebled and the result will 
be awarded. 
The words in the brackets are optional. 
5. Add an explicit cy pres provision. 
Often the entirety of a class recovery in a private suit or in a parens 
patriae action cannot feasibly be distributed to individual class members. 
In these cases the court is required to formulate an alternative distribution 
of the remaining funds. The cy pres doctrine permits these residual funds 
to be distributed for the indirect benefit of class members or other closely 
related purposes. 161 The doctrine originated in the common law and today 
California appears to be the only state that has a statute unequivocally au-
thorizing cy pres distribution in class action cases. 162 
cent of the volume of affected commerce is to be used in lieu of the pecuniary loss under 
§ 8C2.4(a)(3). 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1 cmt. n.3 (2002). 
161. This Subpart draws upon and condenses information contained in Albert A. Foer's forthcom-
ing paper: Enhancing Competition Through the c:y Pres Remedy: Suggested Best Practices (Am. 
Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 07-11, 2007), available at 
hnp:llwww.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/aai- Cy Pres, Foer, best practices wkg paper 11-
07 _11292oo72232.pdf. 
In addition, HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10.17 (3d 
ed. 1992) discusses how the courts have the general equity powers to determine how to distribute the 
funds. "Where no legal claim to settlement benefits exists, a court can exercise its equitable powers to 
distribute the remaining funds." In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 
1393 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (citing Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 843 F. Supp. 491, 495 (W.D. Ark. 
1994». 
162. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384(a) provides: "It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this 
section to ensure that the unpaid residuals in class action litigation are distributed, to the extent possi-
ble, in a manner designed either to further the purposes of the underlying causes of action, or to pro-
mote justice for all Californians." Section 384(b) provides that 
the court shall determine the total amount that will be payable to all class members, if all 
class members are paid the amount to which they are entitled pursuant to the judgment. The 
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The cy pres doctrine permits unclaimed or residual class action funds 
to be put to their next best use for the benefit of class members, and the 
courts have broad discretion to determine how to direct the funds to their 
next best use and to identify qualified recipients. 163 However, there have 
been many settlements where courts have distributed leftover funds to cha-
ritable organizations not in any way related to the plaintiffs' original 
claims. For example, in Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois, 164 the 
court held that its broad equitable powers permitted the use of funds for 
other public interest purposes by educational, charitable, and other public 
service organizations. The court distributed the funds to nonprofit legal 
groups, law schools, and an art museum. 165 In In re Motorsports Mer-
chandise Antitrust Litigation, a price fixing case, the court approved a cy 
pres distribution to charities not in any way related to the underlying anti-
trust issues, including The Make-A-Wish Foundation and The American 
Red Cross. 166 
In light of the purpose of the cy pres doctrine and the possibility that 
the judge will use this money to further his or her pet charities or those of 
the attorneys involved,167 it might be desirable to specifically direct the 
court to order that all of the leftover funds should be used to enhance anti-
trust enforcement: 168 
If, in a class action or parens patriae case filed under this Section, 
including settlements, it is not feasible to return any part of the re-
covery to the injured purchasers, the Court shall order that the re-
sidual funds be applied to benefit the specific injured class of pur-
chasers and/or improve antitrust enforcement on behalf of con-
sumers in general. This shall include enhancing the antitrust en-
forcement budget of the State Attorney General and underwriting 
court shall also set a date when the parties shall report to the court the total amount that was 
actually paid to the class members. After the report is received, the court shall amend the 
judgment to direct the defendant to pay the sum of the unpaid residue, plus interest on that 
sum at the legal rate of interest from the date of entry of the initial judgment, to nonprofit 
organizations or foundations to support projects that will benefit the class or similarly si-
tuated persons, or that promote the law consistent with the objectives and purposes of the 
underlying cause of action, to child advocacy programs, or to nonprofit organizations pro-
viding civil legal services to the indigent. 
163. See Kevin M. Forde, What Can a Coun Do with Leftover Class Action Funds? Almost Any-
thing!, 35 JUDGES' J. 19, 19 (1996). 
164. 827 F. Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. III. 1993). 
165. Id. at 480-87. 
166. 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1396 (N.D. Ga. 2(01). 
167. A few states have a formal procedure for selecting recipients, but most do not. Moreover, the 
State Attorney General when acting in a parens patriae capacity, unlike the judge or the private class 
action attorneys, usually is an elected official who is politically accountable, and presumably is in the 
best position to decide how to allocate funds in the public interest. 
168. It is, however, possible that some state constitutions may prohibit setting up "special purpose" 
funds, and that this could be considered to constitute such a fund. 
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antitrust-enhancing activities of nonprofit education or research 
organizations . 
As an alternative, the residual funds could instead escheat to the state trea-
sury. This escheatment might have the added effect of helping to increase 
state support for antitrust. 
6. Add a collateral source provision. 
In appropriate cases defendants sometimes point out that third parties 
or collateral sources pay purchasers directly, or reimburse them for certain 
products. 169 Defendants sometimes argue that in these cases purchasers 
suffered no "injury" that is cognizable under the antitrust laws, despite 
any higher prices that are caused by an antitrust offense. 170 This defense is 
especially likely to arise in antitrust cases involving pharmaceuticals171 and 
other products covered by insurance or by Medicaid. We are unaware of 
any antitrust damages cases that have recognized this defense, and the 
common law does not favor the defense on the theory that the wrongdoer 
should not gain because the consumer has paid for insurance.172 Neverthe-
less, a state might want to include a collateral source provision: 
Any person injured due to any violation of this Act shall recover 
the full amount of all damages awarded under this Act, even if 
such injured person receives payment for or is reimbursed for 
these damages, directly or indirectly, by an insurance policy, go-
vernmental unit, charity, or other collateral source. 
Any defendant able to escape payment because its purchasers already re-
covered all or part of its damages from, for example, an insurance compa-
ny, would be undeterred from engaging in antitrust violations. In addition, 
this provision would prevent defendants from introducing further compli-
cations and delays into cases involving pharmaceuticais, automobile re-
placement parts, and other products and services. It could, however, lead 
to subrogation claims by third parties. 
7. Include a savings provision: 
169. See, e.g., Goda v. Abbott Labs, 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 171,730, at 79,145-46 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 1997) (rejecting the collateral source defense). 
170. ld. 
171. Defendants can argue that third party payer claims were derivative of consumer claims and 
thus too remote, but that consumers were not injured because they had prescription coverage. If de-
fendants prevail with these arguments, defendants will collect the overcharge, but no one has standing 
to complain about it. 
172. ld. 
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The remedies contained in this Section have always been available 
under applicable state law and/or state Constitutional provisions. 
This provision is intended to codify existing law. 
This provision could be added to IBRs passed in states that arguably al-
ready have an IBR-type provision in an existing "little FTC Act," fraud or 
consumer protection statute, or in the state constitution. Otherwise, the 
addition of an explicit IBR could inadvertently immunize conduct carried 
out prior to its passage. An alternative would be for the statute to explicit-
ly apply to all cases filed after the effective date regardless when the con-
duct occurred. 
IV. A PROPOSED MODEL IUINOIS BRICK REPEALER 
If they had the power to design the United States antitrust system from 
scratch, very few members of the antitrust community would retain the 
current system, which allows suits on the federal level only by direct pur-
chasers, and permits suits on the state level by indirect purchasers in 
some, but not all, jurisdictions. 173 Nevertheless, this status quo might re-
main in effect for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, states without ef-
fective IBRs should be encouraged to protect victimized state consumers 
and businesses by enacting an effective new IBR, or amending an existing 
limited or ineffective statute, rather than wait for a federal solution. 
Whether a state decides to enact an IBR and, if it does, the provisions 
it decides to include, depend critically upon its goals and priorities. For 
example, some do not believe the antitrust laws should have as a high 
priority compensating victims,174 and it is not surprising that these people 
are generally opposed to enacting any form of state IBRs.175 Others have 
as a very high priority designing a system that precludes any chance what-
soever of "duplicative" recoveries and, not surprisingly, they tend to de-
sign systems that favor defendants. 176 
One way to describe a state or federal decision whether to enact an 
IBR and, if so, which type of IBR to implement, is in terms of Types I, II, 
and III error. Normally, analysts employ a framework focused only on 
Type I and Type II error; that is, most frameworks of decisionmaking are 
173. See Prud'homme & Cooper, supra note 21, at 676 ("Like antitrust defense counsel, many 
antitrust plaintiffs' counsel believe the current system is costly, inefficient, and unnecessarily complex. 
However, plaintiffs' counsel typically differ with defense counsel on the appropriate solution. "). 
174. See, for example, Page, supra note 15, at 18-24, 26-27, who focuses on deterrence and 
would eliminate compensation considerations from mRs. 
175. [d. See also Dennis Carlton, Commissioner, Remarks at the Antitrust Modernization Commis-
sion Meeting (May 8, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://govinfo.library . unt.edu!amc!pdf!meetings!0605 08_ Revised _Deliberation_Transcript. pdf). 
176. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Response to Antitrust Modernization Commission's June 
12,2006 Request for Public Comment on Civil Remedies, at 2, 3 (2006). 
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designed to minimize the chances that beneficial conduct is prevented, and 
also to minimize the chances of permitting undesirable conduct. 177 
When a jurisdiction is deciding whether to enact an mR, Type I error 
should include situations involving overdeterrence, where a cartel or mo-
nopoly would be forced to pay damages so large that firms would avoid 
undertaking beneficial conduct out of fear that the conduct would result in 
unjustified or excessive penalties. It also would include overcompensation 
of victims, or "compensation" to purchasers that have not been harmed by 
anticompetitive conduct. 178 Indeed, this type of overcompensation is prob-
ably the primary cause of overdeterrence from an mR. 
By contrast, Type II error would include the costs of failing to discou-
rage cartels and other anticompetitive behavior. It also would include un-
dercompensation of actual victims of the illegal behavior. Not surprising-
ly, undercompensation of true victims can lead to underdeterrence of anti-
competitive behavior. 
In addition to Types I and II error, states considering an mR should 
also consider a third type of error. Type III error occurs when the system 
created to decide the issues leads to increased costs to businesses, consum-
ers, enforcers, or decisionmakers. 179 In the mR context, these costs in-
clude litigation expenses by both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys and 
their expert witnesses, the costs arising from delays, and also the value of 
additional corporate time spent on these issues. It also includes the unde-
sirable effects on society arising from any increased business uncertainty, 
and the increased cost to the judicial system which imposes additional 
costs on taxpayers. Quantitatively, Type III error can be very signifi-
cant,180 and any policy that ignores it runs a substantial risk of departing 
from an optimal result. 
The table below compares three alternative state IBR policies with re-
spect to Types I, II, and III error. It assumes a status quo which permits 
suits only by direct purchasers. The three alternatives are no IBR, an mR 
that does not contain presumptions to simplify litigation, and an mR that 
contains significant presumptions (discussed throughout this Article) that 
would simplify litigation. 
In general, any attempt to minimize one type of error requires increas-
ing at least one of the others. Ideally, we would quantify each of the errors 
involved and choose a policy that minimized the sum of all three (subject 
only to a Congressional decision to value one type of error more highly 
177. See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger En/arcement, 71 
CAL. L. REv. 1580, 1670-71 (1983). 
178. This overcompensation should be figured on a "net" basis. Even if many direct purchasers 
currently are being overcompensated, the overcompensation would not be increased by an mR. 
179. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 177, at 1670-71 (introducing the concept of Type III error; 
defining and using these terms in a related antitrust context; merger enforcement). 
180. Id. 
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than the others). In fact, we have very little data on how large any of the 
three errors would likely be under any of the alternatives. Because of this 
lack of data, reasonable people, with different assumptions about the rela-
tive magnitudes of the errors, can differ as to the optimal enforcement 
policy. 
Comparison of Error Magnitudes Under Alternative Approaches To 
The Enactment of IBRs (relative to the status quo, with no IBR) 
Proposal Type I Error Type II Error Type III Error 
No State IBR Zero Maximizes Zero 
IBR without presumptions Maximizes Minimizes High 
to simplify litigation 
IBR with presumptions Maximizes Minimizes Low 
to simplify litigation 
No one can know what the actual numbers in this table would be. 
However, it appears that Congress, when it enacted the antitrust laws, 
seemed to weigh Type II error much more heavily than Type 1 error. 181 It 
therefore appears that the optimal solution would be for states to enact an 
IBR, but one that contains a number of presumptions that would minimize 
litigation expenses and delays, and also the uncertainty for all concerned. 
The alternative this Article will propose has as its highest priority mi-
nimizing Type II error (i.e., maximizing deterrence against anticompeti-
tive behavior, and maximizing the compensation of victims). It also seeks 
to minimize Type III error (by employing presumptions to simplify litiga-
tion and making it more predictable). 182 By contrast, it has given a much 
lower priority to the Type II error goal of ensuring that no purchasers are 
ever overrewarded; it could occasionally overreward some plaintiffs who 
were indirect purchasers and did not absorb the entirety of the illegal 
overcharges. Occasional overcompensation for some of these plaintiffs is 
the cost of providing an incentive for more classes of purchasers to sue. 
This Article's proposal also could result in a theoretical Type I error risk 
that some lawbreakers would pay more than effective treble damages and 
thereby will be overdeterred183 and less likely to engage in beneficial con-
duct. However, this same risk has existed in many states since soon after 
181. See the discussion in Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 42 passim. 
182. Another benefit of this Article's proposal is that, by simplifying and lowering the costs and 
time required for litigation, it also will maximize certainty for all parties involved. To the extent direct 
and indirect purchaser litigation is consolidated into one proceeding, the percentage of the award going 
for litigation expenses should decreasellanother Type III error benefit. 
183. Overdeterrence is especially unlikely in the large percentage of private suits that are filed 
against cartels that have been criminally convicted of illegal collusion. For information about many of 
these cases, see Lande & Davis, supra note 11. Overdeterrence against such firms is only a remote 
possibility . 
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Illinois Brick was decided, and during this almost thirty year period it has 
never occurred. l84 Indeed, since antitrust damage awards do not include 
prejudgment interest or account for a host of other factors,185 the risk that 
someday a cartel might pay more than true treble damages should be ac-
ceptable. 
The most important elements of such legislation could be contained in 
a small number of relatively brief provisions: 
1. Amend the law to create a right of recovery for indirect purchasers 
that would not affect the recovery of direct purchasers: 
The plaintiff in any action commenced hereunder may sue for and 
recover treble the damages sustained. Such action may be brought 
by any person who is a citizen or resident of this State who is in-
jured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden 
or declared unlawful by this Act, regardless of whether such per-
son dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant. This remedy is 
an additional remedy to any other remedies provided by law, and 
this remedy shall not diminish or offset any other remedy. 186 
2. Give standing to purchasers of component parts: 
A court shall award standing to fIle suit under this Act on behalf 
of every purchaser of a fInal product containing a component part 
or service that has been the subject of an antitrust violation, with-
out regard to whether these purchasers are consumers of, or par-
ticipants in, the markets that were the subject of the antitrust viola-
tion. 187 
3. Include a rebuttable presumption that overcharges, in dollars and 
cents, are passed to fInal indirect purchasers: 
There is a strong presumption that all changes in price due to anti-
trust violations were passed on to every subsequent level in the 
distribution chain as an amount equal to the same change, in dol-
184. There has never been even one well-documented example of a cartel, monopoly, or other 
group of antitrust violators paying more than three times the damages caused by their violation. For a 
discussion, see Lande, Antitrust Damage Levels, supra note 7, at 333-39. See also Prud'homme & 
Cooper, supra note 21, at 684 ("[We have found the possibility of duplicative federal and state treble 
damages payments] in the almost thirty years since Illinois Brick, to be entirely hypothetical. To the 
Authors' knowledge, there has not been a single documented instance where a defendant has been 
subject to suit by direct and indirect purchasers and been required to pay more than treble damages. "). 
185. See Lande, Single Damages?, supra note 27. 
186. See supra Part I.A (discussing its advantages and disadvantages). 
187. See supra Part III.B (discussing its advantages and disadvantages). 
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lars and cents, as the change directly caused by the antitrust viola-
tion and charged to the fIrst purchaser of the product or service in 
question. 
This presumption also applies to any and all changes in price due 
to a change in the cost of an ingredient or a component product or 
service that was caused by a violation of anything in this Act. This 
amount will be presumed to be equal to the change in the cost, in 
dollars and cents, of the ingredient or component product or ser-
vice to its fIrst purchaser. 188 
4. Find that end user purchasers have been harmed by a specifIed 
small amount: 
After a violation has been proven, end users of the products or 
services in question conclusively shall be found to have been in-
jured, and the amount of the injury shall be found to be the larger 
of either 1. 10 % of the amount by which the violators raised or 
lowered the prices of the products or services in question, or 2. 
the amount by which plaintiffs can demonstrate they were injured. 
This fmding shall be made regardless whether the violation oc-
curred in the market containing these fmal products or services, or 
was in an ingredient, component, or input market. 189 
5. Add fIndings or conclusions that simplify class certifIcation litiga-
tion: 
In any class action, . . . the fact of injury and the amount of dam-
ages sustained by the members of the class may be proven on a 
class-wide basis, without requiring proof of such matters by each 
individual member of the class. The percentage of total damages 
attributable to a member of such class shall be the same as the ra-
tio of such member's purchases or sales to the purchases or sales 
of the class as a whole. 
Damages may be proved and assessed in the aggregate by statistic-
al or sampling methods, by the computation of illegal overcharges, 
or by such other reasonable system of estimating aggregate dam-
188. See supra Part III.C (discussing the pros, cons, and other effects of this and other types of 
pass-on presumptions). This provision is a compromise because it uses the milder "presumption" 
(albeit modified with the word "strong") instead of making a finding, and also because it uses the 
"dollars and cents" markup, rather than the percentage markup approach. 
189. See supra Part III.C (discussing its advantages and disadvantages). The selected provision 
should greatly simplify litigation in a large number of cases. See id. 
2010] State Indirect Purchaser Legislation 499 
ages as the court in its discretion may permit, without the necessi-
ty of separately proving the individual claim of, or amount of 
damage to, persons on whose behalf the suit was brought. 190 
6. Include a prejudgment interest provision: 
Damages for injuries by reason of anything forbidden in this Act 
shall include interest thereon computed from the date on which 
such injury is sustained, at a rate equal to the statutory rate for 
post judgment interest in this State, and the cost of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 191 
7. Encourage the State Attorney General to participate as an advisor to 
the judge in consumer class action cases: 
Plaintiffs shall notify the Attorney General about the filing [alter-
natively, the certification] of any class action containing purchas-
ers from that State that involves antitrust allegations. All parties in 
these cases shall send copies of all filings in these cases to the At-
torney General. The Attorney General may, at his or her discre-
tion, intervene or file an amicus brief that gives the presiding 
Judge his or her opinion as to the appropriateness of any proposed 
settlement of the case. 192 
8. In addition to allowing private suits, permit the state Attorney Gen-
eral to file damages actions on behalf of any aggrieved indirect or direct 
purchasers in his or her state: 
The Attorney General may bring a civil action for any violation of 
the provisions of this chapter ... [a]s parens patriae of the per-
sons residing in this state, with respect to damages sustained di-
rectly or indirectly by such persons, or ... as a representative of 
a class ... of persons ... who have been damaged directly or in-
d · tl 193 }fec y .... 
9. Add a cy pres provision: 
190. See supra Part III.B. 
191. See supra Part III.D (discussing the reasons for this provision). 
192. See supra Part II (discussing its advantages and disadvantages). 
193. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 598A.I60(I)(a) (LexisNexis 2005). This would be a supplement to, 
but not a replacement for, private rights of action. Many states already give their attorney general this 
right. See supra Part II. 
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If, in a class action or parens patriae case fIled under this Section, 
including settlements, it is not feasible to return any part of the re-
covery to the injured purchasers, the Court shall order that the re-
sidual funds be applied to benefit the specific injured class of pur-
chasers and! or to improve antitrust enforcement on behalf of con-
sumers in general. This shall include enhancing the antitrust en-
forcement budget of the State Attorney General and underwriting 
antitrust-enhancing activities of nonprofit education or research 
organizations. 194 
Although the preceding provisions together embody most of what an 
effective mR should contain, as has been noted throughout this Article, 
opinions vary greatly as to what constitutes an optimal mR. Some states 
will prefer alternative solutions that are more restrictive,195 and some 
states might prefer a remedy that is more encompassing. l96 This Article 
has proposed a Model IBR with full knowledge that it will not be appro-
priate for every state to enact. Ideally it would be enacted on the federal 
level, but this possibility should not discourage states from developing and 
enacting their own legislation. 
194. See supra Part llI.D (analyzing cy pres issues). 
195. For example, some states might decide to permit only their attorney general to sue on behalf 
of indirect purchasers. See supra Part II. 
196. For example, this Article's suggested Model State mR does not include a provision for either 
the umbrella effects or the allocative inefficiency effects of market power. See supra Part llI.D (dis-
cussing the reasons why these provisions should be included). 
